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Multidisciplinary Practice,
Professional Regulation, and the
Anti-Interference Principle in Legal Ethics
Ted Schneyert
INTRODUCTION
In its June 1999 Report to the American Bar Association
(ABA) House of Delegates, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice recommended legal changes that would permit
lawyers to practice law in multidisciplinary partnerships
(MDPs). MDPs provide legal and other professional services to
the public, and are owned by any combination of lawyers and
nonlawyers who participate in its operations.1 The Report prot Professor of Law, University of Arizona, Tucson; A.B., 1965, Johns
Hopkins University; LL.B., 1968, Harvard University; J.S.M., 1971, Stanford
University.
1. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http://www.abanet.org/epr/mdpreport.
html> [hereinafter REPORT]. More precisely, the Commission defines an MDP
as a:
partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of
its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the
MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal,
as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which a law
firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide services, including legal services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing
of profits as part of the arrangement.
COMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR AS'N,
RECOMMENDATION Recommendation 3 (1999), available at <http'//www.
abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html> [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
Firms owned in whole or in part by passive investors do not qualify as MDPs,
since the Commission supports the traditional ban on passive investment in
law firms. See id. Recommendation 13. However, as law firms increasingly
find themselves competing with large MDPs, their demand for new sources of
capital will create pressure to lift the ban. See Scott Univer, The MDP Commission Report: A Good Beginning,PROF. RESP. NEWS, Summer 1999, at 1, 10.
In this Article, the acronym "MDP" refers either to the concept (multidisciplinary practice) or the institution (a multidisciplinary partnership), depending on the context.
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poses that the state supreme courts 2 relax the ethics rules that
bar lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers and practicing in firms in which nonlawyers hold an equity interest or
managerial control.3 The courts would no longer regard MDPs
as engaged, or MDP lawyers as assisting them to engage, in the
unauthorized practice of law (UPL) by selling legal services
through a "lay intermediary."4 MDPs would thus become lawful, but only as long as they behaved themselves. The Commission also proposes a proactive regulatory program to counter
the risk that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs will somehow induce
their lawyers to place business objectives above the legal profession's core ethical values. 5 In its hypothetical "Model Rule
5.8," the Commission outlines a regulatory program in which
oversee each nonlawyereach state supreme court would
6
controlled MDP in its jurisdiction.
The Commission regards loyalty, competence, confidentiality, and independent professional judgment as the legal profession's "core values." One can hardly disagree. But core val2. More precisely, the Commission refers to the highest court in each juSee
risdiction with the authority to regulate the practice of law.
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, Recommendation 14. In most states, that
authority is the supreme court, so I shall refer to the whole class as such.
3. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, Recommendations 2, 3. Comparable changes have recently been made in the ethics rules governing certified
public accountants, who may now practice in firms up to one-third of whose
owners are not CPAs. See New York MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport Says
Effective Regulatory Scheme Possible, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 94, 95 (Mar. 17, 1999).
4. See REPORT, supra note 1 (expressing the Commission's intention to
leave UPL rules intact except to the extent that MDPs are permitted to practice law).
5. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, Recommendation 14. Purely for
illustrative purposes, the Commission restates this resolution as an amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See COMMISSION ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT, APPENDIX A

(1999), available at <http-//www.abanet.orgcpr/mdpappendixa.html> [hereinafter APPENDIX A] (hypothesizing a new Model Rule 5.8, entitled "Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisciplinary Practice Firm," with comments),
The Commission acknowledge.s, however, that even if the House should accept
its Report in toto, the drafting of any implementing amendments to the Model
Rules would be left to other ABA entities.
6.

See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR

AS'N, UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATIONAL REPORT AND REQUEST

FOR COMMENTS (1999), availableat <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>
[hereinafter UPDATE] (explaining, however, that the Commission did not want
its "conceptual" approach to be detailed, lest it interfere with discussion of
general principles; calling for comments on the approach; and recognizing that
each jurisdiction would ultimately structure its own regulatory procedures).
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ues and useful regulatory concepts are two different things.
The bar and the courts have spent decades giving legal meaning and regulatory significance to three of these values but not
the fourth. Conflict-of-interest rules and disqualification decisions have defined the lawyer's duty of loyal and spelled out its
implications. Malpractice decisions have fleshed out the duty
of competence. Ethics opinions and case law have elaborated
on the duty of confidentiality. By contrast, the regulatory history of "independent judgment" is so thin that the value is dismissed in some quarters as a professional "shibboleth. ' 7 The
sorts of interference lawyers must resist or be shielded from to
play their proper role remain particularly unclear. In academic
parlance, "independent judgment" and "interference" are under-theorized legal concepts.
Although the Commission does nothing to operationalize
"independent judgment" as a term of art, its Model Rule 5.8(c)
is largely designed to protect that value.8 In each jurisdiction
where a nonlawyer-controlled MDP offered legal services, for
example, the rule would require the MDP to file with the court
a commitment, signed by its CEO and Board (or their equivalents), never to "directly or indirectly interfere with a lawyer's
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client."9 The MDP would have to "establish, maintain and enforce" procedures that protect lawyers from interference. 10 It
would have to review its procedures annually and introduce
any changes that are necessary to make them "effective.""
And, it would undergo "administrative audits" at its own12expense and at any intervals the courts found "appropriate." If
an audit revealed interference or inadequate safeguards, the
court could either "decertify" the offending MDP-i.e., bar it
7. RIcHARD ABEL, A.ERICAN LAWYERS 9 (1989). Robert Gordon has
found the "independence of lawyers" richly meaningful as an element in the
ideology and political orientation of the legal profession but without attempting to operationalize the concept as a regulatory tool. See generally Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
8. APPENDIX A, supra note 5.

9. See id. (Rule 5.8(c)(1)).
10. See id. (Rule 5.8(c)(2)).
11. See id. (Rule 5.8(c)(6)). The audit concept appears to have been suggested by a member of the Commission, Judge Paul Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See ABA MultidisciplinaryPanel
Hears Final Witnesses on Regulation of MDPs, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 95, 95 (Mar. 17, 1999) (reporting on a hearing before the
Commission).
12. APPENDIXA, supra note 5 (Rule 5.8(c)(8)).
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from offering legal services-or order it to take "remedial
measures." 13 Any decertified MDP that offered legal services
would be subject to UPL prosecution; and its lawyers, to discipline.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct already include provisions designed to preserve independent judgment.
Those rules express what I shall call the Anti-Interference
Principle of legal ethics. They bar all lawyers, regardless of the
setting in which they practice, from permitting third parties to
interfere with, 14 "direct," or "regulate" their ability to exercise
independent professional judgment in rendering legal services
to a client. 15 The Commission appears to believe, however, that
lawyers practicing in nonlawyer-controlled MDPs 16 will be so
vulnerable to interference that the courts must regulate not
only the lawyers, but their firms-as potential "interferers." 17
13. Id. (Rule 5.8(d)).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f)(2) (1983)
(barring lawyers from accepting compensation from third parties for representing a client unless there is "no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment").
15. See id. Rule 5.4(c) (stating that a lawyer "shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering
such legal services").
16. MDPs in this category would range from huge entities that originated
as accounting firms to MDPs formed by, say, a lawyer, an accountant, and a
certified financial planner. It is not clear why the Commission regards an
MDP in which lawyers hold a 55% ownership interest as significantly less
worrisome for regulatory purposes from one in which they hold a 45% interest.
Even in the former case, one can imagine nonlawyer principals pressing successfully for firm policies that arguably interfere with the exercise of a lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of a client. If that happens, one might
argue then that the MDP's lawyers have acquiesced in the adoption of the offending policy and the regulators should know about it; how better to learn
than through audits? Moreover, as the Commission acknowledges, it is unclear whether to measure "control" by the percentage of an MDP's principals
who are lawyers or by another metric. Cf UPDATE, supra note 6 (seeking
public comment on the issue). To avoid disputes as to who controls any given
MDP, and to turn the auditing process into a broader educational experience,
Professor Terry would extend any audit requirement to all MDPs. See Laurel
S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?, 72
TEMPLE L. REv. 869, 928 (2000).
17. See APPENDIX A, supra note 5 (calling special requirements that Rule
5.8 cmt. 7 imposes on nonlawyer-controlled MDPs "appropriate because of the
serious injury that the MDP's clients may suffer if independence is not exercised"). I see no reason why an MDP's legal client would suffer greater injury
from a lawyer's failure to exercise independence than, say, a client of a legal
services office managed by a lay executive director under the oversight of a
board of directors whose nonlawyer members hold a majority. Perhaps the
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Except in New York 8 and New Jersey, 19 where the courts have
begun to regulate law firms directly, addressing an enforceable
rule of legal ethics to practice entities rather than individual
lawyers would be a novelty.20 Yet Model Rule 5.8 is quite traditional in other respects. Contrary to some commentators, 2 1 the
Commission sees no need for new regulators at the federal level
to conduct audits and otherwise enforce the Rule. It contemplates "continued regulation of the delivery of legal services by
the highest court of each jurisdiction, regardless of the organizational structure in which a lawyer practices."22 MDP oversight would simply be one more task for the familiar institutions of professional "self-regulation"-ethics rules written by
the ABA, promulgated (as amended) by the state supreme
courts, interpreted in bar association ethics opinions, enforced
through the disciplinary process, and reinforced by bans on the
unauthorized practice of law.
I am among those 23 who consider MDP legalization as in24
evitable in the United States as it appears to be elsewhere.
Commission meant that interference is especially likely in MDPs, not that it
would lead to greater injury when it occurred.
18. See 12 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 191, 191 (June 12,
1996) (describing new provisions of New York's Code of Professional Responsibility addressed to law firms). The New York State Bar Association endorses
the regulation of MDPs as entities and would require MDPs themselves to
regulate any nonlegal service providers who are not otherwise subject to professional regulation, as accountants are. See 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 94, 94-95 (Mar. 17, 1999).
19. See N.J. SUP. CT. R. 1:20-1 (amended July 10, 1998) (asserting disciplinary jurisdiction over every lawyer licensed to practice in New Jersey as
well as every "business entity" authorized to practice law in the state); In re
Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, 715 A.2d 216, 216
(N.J. 1998) (reprimanding a law firm after partners agreed that the firm
would solicit clients in-person at a mass disaster site).
20. The ABA recently amended the Model Rules to include a "pay to play"
rule that addresses lawyers and law firms but will be unenforceable against
firms without further changes in disciplinary law. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.6 (2000), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/model_rule7_6.html>.
21. See infra note 37.
22. REPORT, supranote 1.
23. The prevailing view of the many witnesses at Commission hearings
was that MDPs are already here, that they are here to stay, and that "the
ABA's role should be to shape the progression of the legal profession's evolution rather than try to slow or halt it." Direction of Legal Profession Is Debated at MultidisciplinaryPractice Panel Hearings, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 44,44 (discussing conference report) (Feb. 17, 1999).
24. For a recent summary of MDP developments in other countries, see
Terry, supra note 16, at 883-89
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Powerful economic forces are pressing in that direction.25 So
are bar constituencies ranging from "Main Street" lawyers 26 to
corporate counsel,2 7 whose employers welcome an MDPenriched legal services market. In this environment, the legal
status quo will not hold, even if UPL committees continue to
28
back down from confronting the Big Five accounting firms,
which reportedly already offer legal services well beyond tax
advice. 29 Those reputation-minded firms do not seem content
to operate in legal limbo. Ernst & Young recently crafted a
"strategic alliance" with a newly-formed District of Columbia
law firm on terms that mock the law firm/MDP distinction and
may provoke a legal response.3 0
25. See generally id.
26. See id. at 881-83.
27. See ACCA Board Backs Multidisciplinary Concept Allowing Lawyers
to Practicewith Nonlawyers, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 73,
73 (Mar. 17, 1999); see also National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs Endorse
MDPs, 82 TAX NOTES 1543, 1543 (1999), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts
File. The American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) is a specialized
bar association for in-house counsel, with most members working for small to
mid-size businesses. As for large law firms, those that do not wish to become
MDPs or to compete with MDPs may be hostile to legalization, but others have
vowed to lobby for it. See Inside: New PillsburyMadison ChairAims for MDP,
INT'L FIN. L. REv., Feb. 1, 1999, at 4, availableat 1999 WL 23416154.
28. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. The Big Five accounting
firms have become so diversified that they prefer to be called "professional
service firms." I shall refer to them simply as the Big Five.
29. See ABA Commission Examines Controversies over Lawyers' Practice
in Accounting Firms, 67 U.S.L.W. 2323, 2323 (1998) (reporting on testimony to
the effect that the Big Five accounting firms are attracting lawyers with expertise not only in tax law, but in corporate practice, securities, mergers and
acquisitions, employment law, employee benefits, environmental law, intellectual property, health care law, commercial real estate, and regulatory practice); Terry, supra note 16, at 880 (listing "estate planning; litigation support... valuation and business planning advice (including issues of
environmental and labor law compliance as well as employee benefits issues);
and financial planning").
30. Ernst & Young financed the launching of the law firm, which is
headed by highly regarded tax lawyers recruited from Atlanta's King & Spalding. See Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will FinanceLaunch of Law Firm in
Special Arrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B10. The new firm will be
housed on Ernst & Young property, backed by an Ernst & Young loan whose
terms are secret, and known by the trade name of McKee Nelson Ernst &
Young. See id. The two firms will work together to provide "one-stop shopping" for legal and other services. Id. According to Ernst & Young, putting
the law firm in Washington was attractive because of local bar rules, including
a rule permitting the use of a trade name within a law firm's name. See id.
This arrangement raises the issue whether major lenders to a law firm pose
the same risks to lawyer independence that lay equity holders would pose.
For the argument that lenders are indistinguishable from equity investors as

20001

ANTI-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

1475

In August 1999, the House of Delegates resolved not to
support MDP legalization until evidence "demonstrates" that
MDPs will "further the public interest" without "sacrificing or
compromising lawyer independence." 31 This profoundly antiexperimental stance may only encourage MDP supporters to
leave the fractious ABA on the sidelines while they pursue legalization elsewhere. The ABA Litigation Section's failed campaign in the early 1990s to stop law firms in Washington from
establishing ancillary businesses 32 is instructive here. Those
potential sources of interference, see Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the
Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 631-41 (1989). The new law firm is part of an MDP as the
Commission defines the term if there is a "direct or indirect sharing of profits
as part of the arrangement." To determine whether profits are being shared
one would have to know the precise terms of the agreement and whether the
firm is paying Ernst & Young rent and interest at fair market rates.
31. UPDATE, supra note 6. The House resolved that the ABA "make no
change ...to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer
to offer legal services through [an MDP] unless and until additional study
demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients." Id. This resolution treats the preservation of independent judgment not only as a core value, but as an absolute; it implies that
the House would reject a legalization plan that "compromised lawyer independence" even if the members thought the plan would substantially "further
the public interest" in other respects. Id. The resolution was proposed by the
Florida State Bar. See id. General purpose state and local bar associations
are expected to be MDPs' fiercest opponents, both in the ABA and before the
state supreme courts, which often follow their recommendations in matters of
professional regulation. See Siobhan Roth, ABA Report's Opponents Strike
Quickly, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 1999, at 1, 12, available in LEXIS, Individual
Legal News File; Siobhan Roth, Bar Going Nowhere Fast on MDPs, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at 1, 16, availablein LEXIS, Individual Legal News File
(stating that "[t]he state bars don't like MDPs, and many observers say that's
not likely to change"). At the same August 1999 meeting, the House of Delegates adopted a resolution, proposed by the Ohio State Bar Association, urging
each jurisdiction to "establish and support a mechanism for reporting... and
for eliminating instances" of UPL and urging the ABA to coordinate the effort
by setting up a mechanism to report to local regulators on organizations engaging in UPL at a national or multi-state level. Roth, Bar Going Nowhere
Fast on MDPs, supra, at 16.
32. See generally Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIz. L.
REV. 363 (1993) (examining the ABA's ancillary business debate as a matter of
professional politics and policymaking). Ancillaries may be owned and operated jointly by lawyers and other professionals. They have so far been conceived as offering law-related services but not legal services. For example, a
lawyer might form an ancillary with nonlawyers to provide "government relations services"-in other words, lobbying. On the Commission's terms, however, if the lawyer's services would be the practice of law had the lawyer provided them back at his law firm, then they are also the practice of law at the
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firms retain the right not only to own and operate ancillaries in
fields such as government relations, environmental compliance,
and international trade but also to confer partnerships on
nonlawyers who assist the law firms themselves in providing
33
legal services.
As an "inevitabilist," I am less interested in the legalization debate than in the prospects for regulating MDPs once
they are lawful. Accordingly, this Article considers the prospects for regulating MDPs as the Commission contemplates to
preserve the independent professional judgment of lawyers who
practice law in an MDP. My method is to imagine Model Rule
5.8(c) in operation, predict how it would function, assess its
"goodness of fit" with the regulatory task at hand, and consider
what the exercise suggests about the future. To avoid the
problems of defining the practice of law for MDP purposes, I focus on lawyers who specialize in litigation and are unequivocally practicing law.
Part I presents a scenario that highlights the regulatory
challenge of defining, detecting, and preventing interference in
34
an organizationally complex MDP similar to the Big Five.
Most MDPs will presumably be easier to police. Still, with the
specter of the Big Five haunting the legalization debate, any
regulatory system must be designed with such entities in mind.
My scenario is thus an apt one for testing the fit between the
task of preventing interference and the institutions expected to
perform it.
ancillary business, which would turn out to have been an unlawful MDP all
along. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
33. See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1991). This
rule is widely understood to be a narrow liberalization. It permits law firms to
confer partner status on, say, an accountant or financial advisor, but only if
the firm's "sole purpose" is to provide "legal services to clients." Id. In other
words, nonlawyer partners can only work as subordinates to the lawyers, who
alone may control legal work. They cannot advise clients of their own, with no
lawyer in charge, for then they would either be engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law or acting outside the firm's permissible "purpose." Yet Comment 4 describes D.C. Rule 5.4(b) as "rejectfing] an absolute prohibition
against lawyers and nonlawyers joining together to provide collaborative
services, but continu[ing] to impose traditional ethical requirements with respect to the organization thus created." Id. at cmt. 4 (emphasis added). If
subordinates and collaborators are two different things, then the seeds of MDP
legalization are already planted in Comment 4.
34. For simplicity's sake, I disregard the added challenges of protecting
client confidences and privileges and avoiding conflicts of interest between clients in such an entity. For a comprehensive survey of the regulatory issues
MDPs will raise, see Terry, supra note 16, 889-902.
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Part II identifies the interference issues the scenario
raises, and predicts that the Commission's regulatory program
would play no direct role in resolving them. I argue that the
reactive nature of professional self-regulation, coupled with the
under-development of "interference" and "independent professional judgment," as regulatory terms of art, militate against
the effective implementation of the program. Part III extends
that argument by reviewing the regulatory history of other organizational structures where nonlawyer control has been perceived as a threat to independent judgment. None of these
workplaces, I hope to show, has attracted the oversight the
Commission contemplates for MDPs. Rather, the response to
perceived risks of interference has almost invariably been outright prohibition or laissez faire.
My critique of the Commission's regulatory plan may give
MDP opponents some ammunition in the legalization debates.
After all, the less one can expect from regulation, the more
wary of legalization one might become. But arming the opposition is not my aim. Instead, Part IV concludes the Article with
some observations about the modest role law can play in protecting the independent judgment of lawyers who practice in
MDPs.
IMAGINING THE COMMISSION'S REGULATORY
PROPOSALS IN ACTION
Imagine a private entity, "BB," that was once a large accounting firm but has become a diversified "professional services" firm. For some years, BB has offered legal services to the
I.

public, though it denied this 35 until recently, when MDPs were

legalized by the supreme courts in several jurisdictions, by the
California legislature, 36 and by Congress.3 7 BB now offers legal
35. The Big Five do not hold themselves out as practicing law in the
United States. Their lawyers characterize themselves as consultants or tax
advisors, and appear to practice or, if you will, consult in areas of federal law
such as taxation or employer pension plans in which a practitioner need not be
a licensed attorney. By the Commission's light, these lawyers are nonetheless
practicing law to the extent that the same activity at a traditional law firm
would constitute the practice of law.
36. Contrary to most states, California's law of lawyering is mostly legislative. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367 (1994) (demonstrating the California legislature's ineptitude in amending privilege and confidentiality rules).
37. Congress could become a major player in the fight over MDP legalization, and not only for the District of Columbia. Accountants' political action
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services in forty states, mostly to business clients, who not only
employ roughly ten percent of the bar "in house," but also consume about two-thirds of the private legal services rendered
each year in the United States. BB has well over 1,000 lawyers, some of whom have become equity partners, though in
much smaller numbers than the accountants. According to
BB's organization chart, every BB lawyer who provides legal
services to the public is assigned to BB's Legal Division and reports on client matters solely to lawyer-supervisors. The only
exception is Lawyer herself, the tax attorney who is BB's General Counsel and heads the Division. Nonetheless, most BB
lawyers work in branch offices that are managed by nonlawyers. Lawyer ultimately sets their salaries, but with substantial input from office managers as well as lawyer-supervisors.
All BB partners share in any profits the Law Division gener-

committees (PACs) wield considerable clout in Washington. Congress recently
"leveled the playing field" so that accountants can better compete with tax
lawyers by creating a federal accountant-client privilege comparable to the attorney-client privilege. See IRS Restructuringand Reform, Tax Legis. (CCH)
1141 (1998); see also Paul R. Rice, The Wrong Cure for Privilege Envy, LEGAL
TIMES, May 4, 1998, at 26, available in LEXIS, Individual Legal News File
(criticizing the statute as proposed). Moreover, Congress has refused to leave
the regulation of lawyers to the states in other respects. For example, in 1986,
Congress abolished the lawyers' exemption from regulation as "bill collectors"
under the Fair Debt Collection Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (1994). The Supreme Court later held that the Act reaches even lawyers who collect debts by
litigating in state courts. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). In
1998, Congress also stepped in to resolve the long dispute between the Conference of Chief Justices and the ABA, on one hand, and the United State Department of Justice, on the other, over their respective roles in regulating federal prosecutors. See Citizens' Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (adopted Oct.
21, 1998), reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999) (indicating that
lawyers for the federal government are subject to the same state regulations
as other lawyers practicing in their licensing states).
Several observers sympathetic to MDP legalization consider federal legislation the best route to that end. See Direction of Legal Profession Is Debated at MultidisciplinaryPracticePanel Hearings,supra note 23, at 47 (discussing the positions of Samuel Sterrett, former chief judge of the U.S. Tax
Court, and Stefan Tucker, Chair of the ABA Section on Taxation); see also
Sheryl Stratton, ABA Begins to Look at MultidisciplinaryPractice Issues, 81
TAX NOTES 937, 937-38 (1998), availablein LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (reporting view of James Holden, a tax partner at Steptoe & Johnson, who believes
Congress should create a federal commission to regulate professional service
providers, including law firms, that opt into the federal system). For rampant
speculation that Congress will create such a commission by 2015, see Ted
Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV.
125, 129 (1991) (foreseeing a National Disciplinary Commission for Lawyers
and Allied Professionals, or NDCLAP).
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ates, but clients are billed separately for legal services, even for
projects on which lawyers team up with other service providers.
Contrary to federal tax work, which the Treasury Department authorizes accountants as well as lawyers to perform,
most Division services clearly constitute the practice of law.
Accordingly, only lawyers provide those services, though often
with the supervised help of BB accountants, economists, human relations experts, or environmental engineers. BB's lawyers and nonlawyers alike claim to have no trouble distinguishing between projects that call for legal services but
require the assistance of other professionals, where lawyers
must be in charge, and projects that require both legal and
nonlegal services, but where lawyers and nonlawyers may control their own work.38 Despite the complexity of BB's operations, Lawyer prides herself on running "an independent,
multi-branch law firm within an MDP."
Division earnings have been disappointing, however, especially in the Litigation Department. BB's CEO and CFO recently reviewed the problem at headquarters in Chicago. Both
are CPAs. The CFO also has a law degree but does not practice
law. Among other things, they think Litigation has been too
cavalier about advancing funds to cover clients' litigation costs.
Whether and to what extent to "front" expenses have so far
been left to the discretion of lawyers in the Department. As the
CEO knows, Lawyer thinks that this is a sound arrangement.
Her reasoning is simple: whether to advance expenses sometimes depends, at least in part, on a judgment about the potential expense and outcome of the client's case, and the litigators
are BB's most competent, people to make those assessments.
However, an alarming number of clients have proven unable or
unwilling to repay advances. Also, twenty percent of BB's litigation clients retain the firm on a contingent-fee basis. 39 Un38. The Commission supports the principle that an MDP lawyer who is
delivering legal services to an MDP client and who "works with, or is assisted
by, a nonlawyer who is delivering nonlegal services in connection with the delivery of legal services should be required to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 1, Recommendation 10 (emphasis added).
When legal and nonlegal services are "connected" seems far from clear, how-

ever.
39. Interestingly, some of these clients are defendants in commercial litigation. The contingent fee is a percentage of the difference between the defendant's anticipated liability and any lower amount for which the case is resolved. See Michael Orey, Good News/Bad News, AM. LAW, July/Aug. 1991, at
6, available in LEXIS, Individual Legal News File (reporting on a large corpo-

1480

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

FVol. 84:1469

der BB's standard contingent-fee agreement, drafted by senior
lawyers in the Department and approved by Lawyer, clients
who lose their cases need not repay BB for litigation ex40
penses.
Taking all this into account, the CEO sends a memo to
Lawyer. The memo states that the retainer agreement should
be changed to oblige all contingent-fee clients to repay expenses, and that Litigation should in no case advance more
than $80,000 for expenses without first getting the CFO's approval.
Lawyer considers how these changes might affect the Department. She wonders whether the CFO's permission to advance expenses beyond $80,000 would have to be solicited before accepting a case or could instead be solicited in the course
of an engagement, as the need arose. She also fears that the
litigators might conduct too little discovery in some cases for
fear of running up against the $80,000 restriction, especially if
the CFO turns out to be stingy. Her reaction to the proposed
change in the fee agreement is mixed. She worries that the
Department could no longer attract clients who insist on contingent-fee arrangements and have strong cases but will not
tolerate the risk of losing and paying costs to boot. On the
other hand, she has worried for some time that her litigators,
knowing that under BB's general cost control policies the costs
incurred in a losing cause come out of the Department budget,
may be shifting too quickly to a cost-minimizing strategy when
contingent-fee cases even begin to look weak, further reducing
the odds of prevailing. Requiring clients to pay costs, whatever
the outcome, could dampen this perverse incentive.
Lawyer asks whether the CEO's proposals are intended as
orders. The CEO prefers to call them requests. Lawyer then
orders the new policies to be implemented. Citing ethical concerns, the Litigation Department seeks her permission to inform every prospective client for whom BB would advance expenses about the new $80,000 threshold.4 1 Lawyer rejects this
ration that regularly retains counsel on a "defense contingent fee").
40. Some states still require that clients remain unconditionally liable for
expenses. See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e)(1)
(1956). BB would face the inconvenience of modifying its agreement for those
states.
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983) (creating a duty to give clients all the information that is likely to be material to
their decisions, but without indicating whether or when the duty runs to prospective clients); see also id. Rule 1.2(c); infra note 202 and accompanying text
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request, not wanting to needlessly scare away clients whose
cases appear unlikely at intake to generate costs above that
threshold.
Ten supreme courts then decide to audit BB's operations in
their states. Court-appointed teams of management consultants, legal ethicists, and lawyers with management experience
conduct the audits. Team members are experts at MDP assessment, and the audits are well-funded, thanks to the certification fees the courts impose on MDPs that are subject to
audit. As a result, the audits are probing indeed. They all reveal that the Litigation Department's policies on advancing expenses were recently changed in response to the CEO's memo
to Lawyer. On the basis of its auditors' report, each court's disciplinary agency must now determine whether probable cause
exists to believe that (1) BB's process for setting lawyers' salaries; (2) BB's policy of charging Litigation's unrecovered expenses against the Department budget; (3) the CEO's "requests" to Lawyer; (4) the policy requiring the CFO to approve
certain advances; and (5) Lawyer's veto of the litigators' fulldisclosure proposal violate the Anti-Interference Principle, as
embodied in the local version of the Model Rules. A probable
cause finding will lead to formal charges and a proceeding in
which disciplinary counsel must show by clear and convincing
evidence that BB and its agents are interfering with, or inadequately safeguarding, the ability of lawyers in the Litigation
Department to exercise independent professional judgment on
behalf of clients. If the disciplinary counsel meets this burden,
the court will impose an appropriate sanction. Since MDPs are
so new, cases and ethics opinions have not yet addressed
whether a scenario like this involves interference.
II. WHATS WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
A. PROCEDURALLY UNREALISTIC

Anyone who knows much about traditional legal ethics enforcement will find the BB story improbable in two respects.
First, the story envisions a dramatic shift in enforcement mentality but none at all in enforcement institutions. It portrays
state supreme courts proactively enforcing the AntiInterference Principle by conducting extensive audits with no
prior sign of wrongdoing, much as OSHA might enforce safety
(discussing Rule 1.2(c)).
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regulations through random workplace inspections. Yet the
state supreme courts have always been reactive enforcers.
Their disciplinary agencies rarely conduct investigations until
42
someone, usually an aggrieved client, files a complaint,
though a few conduct random accounting audits to detect and
43
deter mishandling of client funds.
If reactive enforcement simply reflected the meager budgets traditionally provided for ethics enforcement, 44 one could
imagine the courts funding proactive MDP regulation by making MDPs pay for it, as the Commission recommends. 45 In fact,
however, modest funding is as much an effect as a cause of the
reactive tradition. Wary of becoming full-time regulators, state
supreme courts rarely favor regulatory initiatives that will take
time away from their primary task of adjudication. Lawyers,
whose bar dues or registration fees fund the disciplinary process, also see virtues in reactive enforcement. For many, proacis a euphemism for intrusiveness and bureautive regulation
46
cratic waste.
To be sure, MDP lawyers might think differently. Maybe
they would welcome auditors as protectors of their professional
autonomy. Maybe they would tell the auditors about every
MDP policy and procedure that concerned them. Yet, other
42. See Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 919, 922 (noting the infrequency of self-initiated investigations by disciplinary agencies). For an overview of disciplinary procedure, see CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 79-144 (1986).
43. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Borrowing"Client Funds Is Defalcation,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 13 (noting that few states use random audits of
client trust accounts as an enforcement measure).
44. As late as 1975, the national rate of disciplinary spending per lawyer
in practice was less than $18 a year. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 42, at
942.
45. One wonders whether state legislatures would permit the courts to
impose regulatory taxes on nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, especially if the
amounts were based on local revenues from nonlegal as well as legal services.
Perhaps the courts would consider themselves entitled to the last word on the
subject by virtue of their state constitutional authority to regulate the practice
of law and to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with their regulatory
objectives. See WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 22-31 (discussing the use of separation-of-powers doctrine by state supreme courts to maintain control of law
practice).
46. See, e.g., Stefan F. Tucker, Whom Do the Model Rules Protect?,LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at 25, 26, available in LEXIS, Individual Legal News File
(calling for federally mandated deregulation of the bar since today's law firms
are adequately regulated by "customer demands and expectations" backed up
by damage suits and reputation-impairing publicity).
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lawyers who work under lay managers and may therefore be
vulnerable to interference-for example, corporate counsel, legal services lawyers, lawyers in group legal services programs,
and insurance defense counsel employed by liability insurershave never clamored for special regulatory protection. On the
contrary, they have opposed more proactive measures to protect
their independence. 47 I infer that the reactive tradition will
carry over, willy-nilly, to MDP regulation. Audits, if conducted
at all, will be infrequent and perfunctory. Interference issues
will have to come to the disciplinary agencies through complaints. Yet, complaints will be rare because few clients will
know or care enough to complain about third-party "interference," and even 48
fewer MDP lawyers will file complaints against
their own firms.
This is not to say that the Commission's program will have
no impact. The regulatory backdrop could give MDP lawyers
some leverage in negotiating a modus vivendi with their em-

47. For example, Rule 5.4 as it appeared in the Kutak Commission's 1981
public draft of the Model Rules stated:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or
by a lawyer acting in a capacityother than that of representingclients,
such as a business corporation, insurance company, legal services organization, or government agency, but only if the terms of the relationship provide in writing that (a) there is no interference with the
lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the clientlawyer relationship ....
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AMERICAN BAR
AsS'N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981), reprinted in C. Barry Schaefer, Proposed Model Rule 5.4: Is It
Necessary For Corporate Staff Counsel?, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 639, 641
(1981-1982) (emphasis added). This appeared to require employers to certify
in writing that house counsels' independence was being preserved, a rare use
of legal ethics rules to regulate nonlawyers in their relations with lawyers.
Mr. Schaefer, the general counsel for a railroad, opposed the rule, arguing that
however useful the provision might be in governing relations between legal
services lawyers and their employers, it made no sense for house counsel,
whose employers are also their clients. See id. at 641-46. He saw no significance in the fact that, although the employer is the client, the directors and
officers who oversee the house counsel's work are not. See id. at 643 n.14.
48. In cases where MDP lawyers are fired for refusing to permit "interference," however, they may sue their former employers for wrongful discharge,
as corporate counsel have begun to do. See infra note 117 and accompanying
text. If the courts honor such claims, they will be protecting lawyer independence through employment law-i.e., through means other than professional
self-regulation. Their understanding of what lawyer independence requires
may or may not dovetail with the organized bar's understanding.
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ployers. 49 As MDPs mature, associations such as the ABA and
AICPA might jointly identify procedures that work well, and
promote them as "best practices" and "safe harbors" for
MDPs. 50 Perhaps MDPs will eventually form their own selfregulatory body to suggest procedures, conduct audits, and report to the state supreme courts. 5' But the evolution of safeguards against interference will turn more on these processes
than on court-imposed audits, disciplinary cases, or MDP decertification proceedings. This means that whatever safeguards emerge will not be engineered by the bar and the state
supreme courts unilaterally.
One also wonders where the regulatory expertise contemplated in the BB scenario would come from.52 To be sure, malpractice insurers sometimes audit law firms to assess their ex-

49. Consider an analogy from the legal services field. In 1977, several clients of a legal services program offering health-related legal services to Native
Americans had potential claims against one of the program's funding sources.
See Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics
Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 91 (1981). The
program's governing board, which included nonlawyers, forbade program lawyers to pursue these claims. See id. The lawyers felt that a veto on pursuing
the claims would interfere with their professional judgment, which they could
not permit under Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon DR 5107(B) (1980). See Finman & Schneyer, supra, at 91. They sent the Board a
memorandum citing the rule and certain ethics opinions. See id. The Board
then "acquiesced and resolved to support a 'policy of non-interference with the
professional judgment of... attorneys as required by the Code... especially
DR 5-107(B).'" See id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Bush, Health Law Division Attorney, to Ted Finman (Mar. 17, 1977)). Yet, it was far from clear that
vetoing the suits before the cases were accepted would implicate the rule. See
id. at 90-92.
50. Cf Committee on Legal Opinions, American Bar Ass'n, Third Party
Legal Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of
Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167, 224-34 (1981)
(publishing guidelines developed by transactional lawyers to promote "best
practices" and standardized terms in the writing of third-party legal opinions).
51. If the state supreme courts were to delegate oversight to a selfregulating organization (SRO) of MDPs but retain the authority to overrule
the SROs' determinations, the system would fit the description of "audited
self-regulation." That approach has become prominent in the securities industry, where the SEC relies on the expertise of private SROs to monitor brokerdealers, but occasionally reverses the rulemaking and enforcement decisions of
the SROs. See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited SelfRegulationas a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 204-06 (1995).
52. On the crucial need for expertise in conducting regulatory audits, see
Thomas P. Grumbly, Self-Regulation: PrivateVice and Public Virtue Revisited,
in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 93, 116 (Eugene Bardach &
Robert A. Kagan, eds. 1982); Michael, supra note 51, at 181-82.
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posure to liability and their risk avoidance systems. 53 Disciplinary agencies must also delve into issues of law-office management in responding to complaints about sole practitioners
and lawyers in small firms.5 4 But these activities will not produce experts on MDP interference, which has no analogue in
law firms. Nor are audits the only stage in the system that
demands expertise. A court that finds interference, we are told,
can either decertify the offending MDP or order "remedial
measures." To develop sensible remedial measures, or evaluate
the measures an offender proposes to take, the court or its
designee would have to understand in detail MDP operations
and incentive structures.55 Few courts will take the time to obtain that understanding.
Yet the simpler disposition-decertification-will usually
be too harsh and, when it is imposed, UPL enforcement may
not back it up. The Big Five have already demonstrated their
power to derail UPL investigations.56 A firm such as BB, if

53. For discussion of legal malpractice insurers as auditors as well as de
facto regulators of the bar, see George M. Cohen, Legal MalpracticeInsurance
and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 307 (1997-1998); Anthony E. Davis, ProfessionalLiability
Insurers As Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220-21
(1996).
54. See, e.g., William J. Wernz, Probation as a Disciplinary Disposition. . ., BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 1987, at 9 (discussing disciplinary counsels'
growing use of probation with conditions to correct the law office practices of
sole practitioners and small-firm lawyers who have neglected files or maintained inadequate records).
55. Recognizing that the state supreme courts are unlikely to become experts on MDP operations, Professor Terry criticizes the Commission for making no specific suggestions about the content of a court audit of an MDP.
Terry, supra note 16, at 929. She attributes the Commission's failure to do so
to a "desire not to step on state supreme court toes," id., but a better explanation may be the difficulty of deciding how to audit for possible interference
with professional judgment when nobody has a firm grasp of what constitutes
interference.
56. The best publicized retreat by UPL enforcers occurred in Texas. In
August 1997, the state supreme court's UPL committee received a complaint
that Arthur Andersen, a Big Five firm, was practicing law by preparing legal
documents, forming new companies for clients, and preparing tax opinions on
state and federal law. See Sheryl Stratton, The End of the Legal Profession?,
TAX NOTES, Feb. 15, 1999, at 948, 950, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File
(reporting that Arthur Andersen's defense expenditures were "considerable,"
while the bar had to rely on pro bono legal services from in-state counsel). To
much fanfare, the committee mounted an 11-month investigation, only to dismiss the complaint when it became clear that the firm had retained the counsel and experts necessary for an aggressive and comprehensive defense. See
id. More recently, the Virginia bar counsel abandoned a UPL investigation
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ever decertified, might continue to provide legal services, deny
that it was doing so, and defend itself so fiercely that resourcestarved prosecutors could rarely make UPL charges stick.
Other historical patterns confirm these enforcement limitations. Professional discipline has never played a significant
role in governing lawyers in large law firms, 57 though it does
help govern relations between sole practitioners and their clients. 58 The difficulty of investigating individual wrongdoing
within complex firms, the hostility of firms to intrusion, the indifference of business clients and third-party victims to the
minimal redress the disciplinary system can provide, and the
aggressive defense large firms would mount to protect their
reputations all contribute to the pattern. This is not to say that
large firms and their lawyers are never held accountable for
wrongdoing, 59 only that when they are, it is chiefly through
civil liability,60 trial court sanctions such as fines or disqualification, 61 or enforcement actions by federal agencies. 62 A study
conducted in the 1980s found that eighty percent of the lawyers
disciplined in California, Illinois and the District of Columbiajurisdictions with many large law firms-were sole practitioners; none came from firms with eight or more lawyers. 63 Big
into the "compliance law services" offered by an "unnamed professional services firm." UPDATE, supra note 6. Moreover, UPL enforcement in some states
is within the province of state prosecutors, not the bar. Resource constraints
and lack of evidence of harm make UPL enforcement a low priority for these
enforcers.
57. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1991) (discussing why so few disciplinary actions
target practice in large law firms); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 822-35, 869-72 (1992) (same).
58. See supra note 54.
59. But see Lisa Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and
Expense Fraudby Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 232-37, 295 (1999)
(discussing recent cases in which large-firm lawyers have been suspended or
disbarred for stealing from clients or from their firms).
60. See, e.g., William B. Glaberson et al., A Question of Integrity at BlueChip Law Firms: Once Unthinkable, Charges of Foul Play Are HittingPrestigious Partnerships,BUS. WK., Apr. 7, 1986, at 76 (noting the surprising frequency with which charges of wrongdoing were being leveled at large law
firms in nondisciplinary forums).
61. See Wilkins, supra note 57, at 827-38 (discussing direct institutional
control of lawyers for large clients by trial courts).
62. See Schneyer, supra note 57, at 37-45. See generally Ted Schneyer, A
Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "EthicalInfrastructure"of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998) (explaining the practical advantages of these non-disciplinary regulatory techniques).
63. See ABEL, supra note 7, at 145.
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Five MDPs will be no less formidable targets than large law
firms. It is unrealistic to expect active oversight of large MDPs
from courts and disciplinary agencies that have never established a regulatory beachhead against large law firms-entities
they know much better.6 4
One final point about the Commission's regulatory vision.
The Commission hopes through MDP regulation to keep as
many Big Five lawyers as possible in the legal profession's
regulatory fold. To achieve this, MDP lawyers who presently
claim to practice "tax" or to be "consultants" must be viewed as
engaging in the practice of law and subject, therefore, to all the
rules of legal ethics. Accordingly, the Commission would posit
that lawyers are engaged in the practice of law (and cannot
make representations to the contrary) whenever their work
would constitute the practice of law if provided "by a lawyer in
a law firm."65 By this test, when a lawyer forms a consulting
firm with two nonlawyers to provide a "gray area" service such
as lobbying,66 the lawyer will presumably be practicing law
64. In light of the "more ethical than thou" attitude that some lawyers
take toward the accounting profession, it seems ironic that the AICPA has for
several decades maintained a system of regulatory oversight for accounting
firms that audit publicly held companies. See Andrew A. Sommer, The Accounting Profession's Peer Review Program, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 375, 376
(1989).
65. REPORT, supra note 1.
66. Many services that constitute the practice of law when lawyers provide them in law firms do not constitute law practice for UPL purposes when
nonlawyers provide them. Lobbying is just one example. Since lawyers in
most states may not form a partnership with nonlawyers if any of its activities
constitute the practice of law, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.4(b) (1983), our hypothetical lawyer-lobbyist could be disciplined under
current rules for forming the consulting firm if the Commission's test applied.
Yet such firms are precisely what Model Rule 5.7 permits under the "ancillary
business" rubric. See id. Rule 5.7 cmt. 8. The Commission's position is also at
odds with the modern view that a lawyer may practice a law-related profession such as lobbying outside of a law office without being subject to all legal
ethics rules. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972) (stating that although a lawyer who practices a lawrelated profession from his law office is subject to all rules of ethics, this is not
so when the lawyer practices that profession from a separate office and does
not hold himself out as a lawyer).
It is too often forgotten that the definitions of "law practice," "legal service," and "legal assistance" vary with the purpose for which the terms are
used. For the Commission, a lawyer is presumably practicing law when he
helps a law-firm client prepare a simple state income tax return. Yet accountants providing the same service are not practicing law, nor is the service likely
to constitute legal assistance for purposes of determining the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege to lawyer-taxpayer communications.
See
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(unless she surrenders her license), and the firm will be subject
to full-scale MDP regulation, even though one need not be a
lawyer to lobby. 67 This "maximum jurisdiction" policy significantly increases the universe of MDPs the ethics enforcers
would be expected to oversee.
B. SUBSTANTIVE INDETERMINACY: IN AN MDP, WHAT
CONSTITUTES "INTERFERENCE"?

Putting aside the mismatch between traditional state supreme court regulation of the bar and the requisites for proactive MDP regulation, we come to the second key problem the
BB scenario illustrates, namely, the uncharted and highly contestable meaning of Anti-Interference Principle. Regulators
cannot detect and sanction interference without knowing it
when they see it. Yet the Commission never discusses what
should constitute interference in an MDP-testimony perhaps
to the intractability of the issue. Instead, the Commission
leaves it to state supreme courts, disciplinary agencies, and
ethics committees to flesh things out. The scenario illustrates
how difficult this would be even under ideal regulatory conditions. In particular, it shows how hard it can be to distinguish
decisions that call for a lawyer's judgment qua lawyer from decisions that nonlawyers can properly make even though they
may affect lawyer-client relationships.
We can safely assume that BB's CEO would unduly interfere if he ordered a litigator not to take scheduled depositions
that the lawyer consider crucial in a current case because the
CEO had just learned that the client's financial position was
precarious. After all, lawyers themselves cannot ethically curtail service in midstream simply because they lose confidence in
a client's ability to pay fees or expenses. 68 If canceling the
depositions would breach the litigator's duty of competence,
then the CEO's insistence on cancellation would surely interfere with the litigator's exercise of professional judgment. On
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122, illus. 2 (Pro-

posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating that the trier of fact in such a case may
"infer that Client's purpose was not that of obtaining legal assistance," in
which case no privilege applies).
67. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, MDP Commission Opts
for Expanded Regulation and Economic Protectionism, PROF. REsP. NEWS,
Summer 1999, at 5, 20-21 (criticizing the Commission's test as overly broad).
68. See, e.g., In re Daggs, 187 N.W.2d 227, 228 (Mich. 1971) (stating that
"[tihe failure of a client to pay for [a lawyer's] services does not relieve a lawyer of his ethical duty to perform them completely and on time").
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the other hand, whether to close down the Litigation Department when it completes its current engagements would clearly
be a business decision, even if it affects consumer access to legal services in the future. These, however, are the easy extremes. A vast range of decisions fall in between.
Consider the CEO's policy changes regarding the advancing of expenses. Both will apply only to future clients, unlike a
midstream order to stop taking depositions. Yet the requirement that the CFO approve advances above $80,000 might "interfere" even if the change in the contingent-fee agreement does
not, at least if the former will require litigators to defer to the
CFO's mid-engagement decisions, which could upset the litigators' pre-trial and trial plans.
If the CFO's midstream intervention would otherwise be
improper, would telling all prospective clients about the approval process legitimate it by turning it into a mutually agreed
upon limit on the scope of the representation? Is the CFO's intervention acceptable in any event because he is a lawyer,
though not one who currently holds himself out as practicing
law?69 Suppose he is licensed to practice in Illinois but not in
the auditing states? Would it help to have the CFO's commitment to wear his lawyer's hat whenever he reviews requests for
additional advances?
As for the memo to Lawyer, does it matter whether the
CEO's statements were requests as opposed to orders? Would
such a distinction be administrable? Does it matter whether
Lawyer bowed to the "requests" because of the CEO's rank or
69. Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1232 (1972) (finding improper interference where legal services
lawyer was required to get approval of lawyer-program director before expanding current client's case into a class action), with ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (stating that staff lawyers of legal services office are subject to direction and control of senior lawyers including executive director of office, just as law firm associates are subject to control by senior lawyer; only control by an "external source" such as a
lay board is improper). These opinions are further discussed infra notes 17995 and accompanying text. As proposed in 1981 by the Kutak Commission,
but later rejected, Model Rule 5.4(a) treated lawyer-managers in lay organizations, such as public defenders or legal services office directors, as nonlawyers
for interference purposes. See supra note 47; cf Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F.
Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Nev. 1974) (holding that because an employer has no
right to interfere with a lawyer-employee's judgment on behalf of a client, a
public defender is not vicariously liable for the malpractice of his salaried
deputies); Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 473, 516-18
(discussing Sanchez).
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instead decided for herself that the changes would not prejudice clients? Is that distinction administrable?
Finally, when Lawyer ordered her litigators not to tell prospective clients about the new policy on advancing expenses
unless their cases seemed likely at the outset to be expensive,
did she violate the Anti-Interference Principle? Is it relevant
that the order governs communications that occur before lawyer-client relationships are formed? Can a lawyer be said to
exercise professional judgment on behalf of a client before she
has a client?
Lawyer is part of BB's management team but unlike the
CFO, she also practices law at the firm. Her order is unquestionably the product of a "lawyer's" judgment. But is the order,
ipso facto, the product of professional judgment and, thus, incapable of violating the Anti-Interference Principle? My first
instinct is to say, no, on the theory that Lawyer gave the order
qua manager. Not only was she motivated by business concerns, but she overruled the litigators' ethics-based judgment
that the new policy should be disclosed to every prospective client for whom BB would be prepared to advance expenses.
Forcing her subordinates to exalt business goals over ethical
concerns seems to be interference par excellence, at least if the
resulting nondisclosures would be improper even if they were
the product of the subordinates' independent judgment. 70
70. Complications lurk here. Should it be a per se violation of the AntiInterference Principle for a lay manager to press an MDP lawyer-unduly?to take steps in representing a client which the lawyer considers improper or
imprudent, even if the action itself would be entirely proper if only it had
sprung from her own "professional judgment?" Does the nature of the pressure matter? Must it actually succeed, as of course it must, to charge the lawyer with permitting a third-party to interfere? If it must succeed, must it also
have a demonstrably adverse effect, such as harming the client or inducing
behavior that is unethical in other respects? In defining the mischief that the
Principle exists to combat, Stephen Gillers lays no stress on the demoralization costs inherent in getting a lawyer to act against her better judgment on a
matter she believes is within her professional jurisdiction. See Stephen
Gillers, The Anxiety of Influence, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 126 (1999). Perhaps he fears that, if the Principle is enforced with a view to preventing those
effects, lawyers will all too readily entertain the belief, in hopes of expanding
their writ beyond its proper bounds. He emphasizes instead the risk that lay
pressure will succeed in having a "bad" or "baleful" influence on the lawyer's
conduct. Id. As a regulatory matter, I think his instincts are sound. Given
the reactive nature of professional self-regulation, the only practical means of
enforcing the Principle may be in response to grievances and lawsuits filed by
clients and others who think the lawyer's conduct caused them unjustified
harm. From the standpoint of fortifying MDP lawyers in their efforts to negotiate favorable arrangements for pressuring their independence, however, a
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On the other hand, to say that even lawyer-managers in an
MDP can violate the Principle by giving orders based on nonprofessional considerations has troubling implications. It requires enforcers to assess motives, a difficulty the scenario
masks by simply assuming that Lawyer was motivated by
business concerns. Moreover, if placing lawyers under the exclusive supervision of other lawyers tends to promote ethical
conduct, as most of us lawyers think, then regulators should
encourage MDPs to do so. Offering MDPs a safe harbor against
interference charges when the supervisors in question are licensed to practice law is one possible inducement.7 1 Finally, in
governing relations between superior and subordinate lawyers,
the Principle is superfluous. If a law firm's managing partner,
citing a temporary cash-flow problem, orders his litigation department to curtail discovery in all cases in which the firm is
committed to advance expenses, thereby prejudicing clients, he
can be held accountable on simpler grounds, such as incompetence7 2 or improper supervision. 73 In the BB scenario, Lawyer's
order should be treated the same way-as long as she maintains a license to practice law and is therefore subject to disciplinary control. 74
III. WORKPLACE INTERFERENCE AND ITS
REGULATION: A BRIEF HISTORY
Even if the meaning of "interference" in an MDP context
remains uncharted, readers may suspect that my litany of un-

broader definition of improper interference may be in order.
71. The Commission has proposed a similar inducement. Rule 5.2 of the
Model Rules insulates a subordinate lawyer from discipline if he violates another rule of ethics by acting on the basis of a supervisor's reasonable, though
mistaken, resolution of an arguable question of professional conduct. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2 (1983). The Commission

would extend this protection to subordinate lawyers working in an MDP, but
only when the supervisor is another lawyer. See RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 1, Recommendation 6 (stating that a lawyer "acting in accordance with a
nonlawyer supervisor's resolution of a question of professional duty should not
thereby be excused from failing to observe the rules of professional conduct").
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
73. See id. Rule 5.1 (defining the lawyer's duty to supervise subordinate
lawyers).
74. If Lawyer's order breaches ethical duties but was not dictated by lay
management, perhaps BB should not be held responsible for her wrongdoing
in an MDP decertification proceeding. After all,'BB has no right to interfere
with Lawyer's independent professional judgment, even when it is exercised
unwisely.
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answered questions about BB's operations exaggerates the
definitional problems involved. Perceived threats to lawyer
autonomy are hardly new. Over time, a number of practice settings have been identified in which interference is a palpable
risk. Broadly speaking, the dangers those settings pose are the
dangers posed by MDPs. Nevertheless, I shall now argue that
the responses of the traditional system of professional selfregulation to interference risks in those settings provide few
hints about how to detect, identify, prevent, or rectify interference in MDPs. One reason for this is that we have had little
experience at controlling interference risks through regulation,
as opposed to trying to avoid them wholesale by outlawing the
practice settings in which they arise. 75 Before 1960, the state
supreme courts barred lawyers from practicing in a number of
presumptively high-risk settings, such as group legal services
programs. 76 This eliminated any need for regulatory oversight
but it also stunted the growth of any regulatory expertise on interference issues. Later, federal intervention and growing divisions within the organized bar made some bans, including the
ban on group legal services programs, unsustainable. Yet no
regulation of the sort the Commission now contemplates for
MDPs developed when those bans fell-no customized ethics
rules like the Commission's proposed Rule 5.8 and no audits or
other proactive techniques that could serve as a template for
MDP regulation. For better or worse, the limits of state supreme court regulation and the complexities lurking behind the
Anti-Interference Principle have mostly left lawyers and their
potential "interferers" to hammer out their own accommodations.
A. SOURCES OF INTERFERENCE IN GENERAL
Financial ties, personal allegiances, and obligations to
third parties can jeopardize any lawyer's capacity to make disinterested decisions and offer sound professional advice on behalf of clients. If parents retain a close friend to defend their
son on criminal charges, for instance, the lawyer may be
tempted or pressed to represent the son as the parents wish but
the son does not. Legal ethics rules do not bar parents from
trying to "interfere;" they bar lawyers from permitting third75. "By and large," Professor Gillers writes, "we have eschewed finetuning
and have preferred broad and absolute prohibitions." Gillers, supra note 70,
at 126.
76. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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party payors to interfere. 77 To anticipate the impact of the
Commission's novel program for regulating MDPs as potential
interferers, one must focus on the treatment to date of interference risks created (or inadequately avoided) by the organizational structure in which a lawyer works. How, I shall ask,
have those risks been addressed and what do the responses
suggest about the prospects for preventing interference in
MDPs through active state supreme court regulation? The
workplaces I shall consider are law firms, corporate law departments, and several forms of "lay intermediaries"-i.e., organizations, other than law firms, that employ lawyers to provide legal services to third parties.

B. INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF INTERFERENCE
1. Group law practice: The law firm
On the basis of the Anti-Interference Principle, English
barristers 78 and lawyers in some civil law countries7 9 have traditionally been forbidden to form law firms, let alone MDPs. If
two barrister-partners, or a partner and an associate, should
disagree about the proper course to take for a client, the argument runs, one would have to accede to the other's wishes,
thereby stifling his own professional judgment. This view has
never prevailed in the United States, 80 but is worth noting for
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1983) ("A
lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.").
78. See W.W. Boulton, The Legal Profession in England. Its Organization,
History and Problems, 43 A.B.A. J. 507, 507 (1957) (stating that barristers
may not form partnerships but commonly share "chambers").
79. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 113 (1969)
(noting that lawyers in some civil law countries are forbidden to form partnerships on the ground that each lawyer must be free to decide how a client's affairs should be handled). For a fascinating account of the gradual reconciliation of (1) the French avocat's traditional duty not to subordinate himself to
other avocats with (2) modern economic pressures to form law firms and inhouse legal departments, see JOHN LEUBSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL
DIGNITY: LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE 29-38 (forthcoming 2000).
80. But the concern is not unheard of here. See BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN,
LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 226 (1970) (stating that "there
was at one time some fear that large firm law practice endangered the lawyerclient relationship," but "[e]xperience has shown this fear to have been unfounded"); cf Ortiz v. Barrett, 278 S.E.2d 833, 840 (Va. 1981) (finding that cocounsel who ultimately acceded to lead counsers trial strategy did not thereby
violate DR 5-107(B), which required lawyers to exercise independent profes-
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its sensitivity to interference even from sources as likely to enhance as to diminish the quality of a lawyer's work. Here the
putative interferers are other lawyers exercising their independent judgment! Extended this far, the Anti-Interference
Principle becomes detached from its policy rationale, which (I
take it) is not to promote lawyer autonomy for its own sake, or
for the sake of lawyers' job satisfaction and public image, but
for the sake of the client interests and third-party rights lawyers must protect.
2.

Corporate Law Departments

Since railroads began to have recurrent and specialized legal needs in the 1880s, 81 many American lawyers have practiced "in-house" as salaried employees of corporate clients.
Roughly ten percent of the bar does so today. 82 The arrangement is entirely lawful and receives no special scrutiny from
the state supreme courts. Indeed, at least fifteen jurisdictions
now permit house counsel who are admitted to practice elsewhere to give a local company legal advice. 83 Nevertheless, two
subtly different interference problems can arise in this setting.
I shall refer to them as interference with and interference byin other words, with the lawyer-client relationship or by the client. Only the first involves professional judgment on behalf of
clients and receives the Commission's explicit attention. 84 Yet
MDP lawyers could encounter both problems, just as corporate
counsel do.

sional judgment on behalf of a client).
81. Railroads began to form their own law departments in the 1880s as
regulatory agencies began to oversee their operations. See Schaefer, supra
note 47, at 639, 640 n.3.
82. This percentage has been static for some time. See BARBARA CURRAN,
THE LAWYERS' STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980S, at 12 (1985).
83. See Carol A. Needham, PermittingLawyers to Participatein MultidisciplinaryPractices:Business as Usual or the End of the Professionas We Know

It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1357 (2000) (listing fifteen jurisdictions); Carol A.
Needham, The MultijurisdictionalPractice of Law and the CorporateLawyer:
New Rules for a New Generation of Legal Practice, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1075,

1085 (1995) (listing nine states).
84. See REPORT, supra note 1 (proposing to require MDPs to certify that
they will not "interfere with a lawyer's exercise of independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client" (emphasis added)). The proposal ignores the
possibility that lawyers can or should ever exercise professional judgment on
behalf of something or someone else. But lawyers can, should, and do. That is
the sort ofjudgment that needs protection from interference by the client.
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a. Interference With
A corporate client can only interact with its lawyers
through other agents-i.e., management. Those agents are
emphatically not the client,85 and they can be motivated by personal interests that conflict with corporate interests. Yet they
have authority to hire, fire, promote, discipline, and set salaries
for the client's in-house lawyers-hence the risk of managerial
interference with in-house counsel's exercise of professional
judgment on behalf of her client.
Here is an example of interference with: VP, Bigcorp's vicepresident for marketing, rejects counsel's advice to drop a proposed pricing scheme that, according to counsel, violates antitrust laws and could lead to substantial liability for the company. VP insists on going ahead with the scheme, convinced
that the violation will go undetected, enable the department to
reach its annual sales goal, and earn him a big bonus. Sensing
the danger to Bigcorp, counsel threatens to go to the CEO unless VP reconsiders. 86 VP threatens to fire the lawyer, who is
assigned to VP's department. The lawyer relents, tells no one,
and by his inaction permits the scheme to go into effect. The
lawyer has allowed a third-party (VP) to interfere with his exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client.
Few if any corporate counsel have ever been disciplined for
such capitulations,87 though the general and long-standing rule
against allowing employers to "direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment"8 8 on behalf of clients seems to apply. If
the rule helps prevent interference, it is only as a source of professional leverage in negotiating a modus vivendi with lay
managers, or perhaps as a source of inspiration for lawyers
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983).
86. See id. Rule 1.13(b).
87. However, inside as well as outside counsel are sometimes held accountable for such conduct through civil suits. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 682-712 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding corporate
lawyers violated securities law by allowing merger to close, as management
wished, after learning that the stockholders had been misinformed about the
other party's financial condition). On similar grounds, lawyers have also become targets of administrative enforcement actions by federal agencies. See,
e.g., Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW.,
May 1992, at 68-77 (reporting on Office of Thrift Supervision intra-agency proceeding that recovered $41 million in restitution from Kaye, Scholer and debarred two partners from federal banking practice; the firm allegedly aided
Charles Keating in ransacking his thrift and the law firm's client, Lincoln
Savings).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1983).
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predisposed to stand up to managers like VP. Any law that deters managerial interference more directly is likely to be quite
specific, as most rules of legal ethics are not, 89 and to address
management-i.e., the potential interferers. Consider two examples.
First, under the Model Business Corporation Act, no board
can rely on a legal opinion from house counsel (or even regular
outside counsel) to decide if a director is eligible to be indemnified by the company for certain legal expenses. Only lawyers
who have no prior relationship with those seeking indemnification will do.90 Thus, corporate law presumes, as ethics rules do
not, that house counsel's employment status poses an undue
risk that those seeking, favoring, or opposing indemnification
will interfere with his exercise of judgment on behalf of the
company. The second example comes from Yablonski v. United
Mine Workers,91 which involved a suit by union members,
analogous to a shareholder derivative action, to enforce the fiduciary duties of management to the union. The allegedly corrupt union kingpin selected the union's inside counsel to represent the union.9 2 No rule of legal ethics expressly barred
counsel from taking the case, though the propriety of doing so
was dubious given the serious charges and the fact that top
93
union management was allegedly involved in the wrongdoing.
Yet, the court disqualified these lawyers on the theory that
house counsel could not be as "unquestionably independent" as
since their future employment was in
the situation demands,
94
management's hands.

89. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice,and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 223, 224-25 (1993) (noting that legal ethics codes, in part because they
must address all manner of lawyers, are weak at specifying rules for specialized fields or practice settings).
90.

See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.55 official cmt.

(1984).
91. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
92. See id. at 1040.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.7(b)
(1983) (barring representations that "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities ... to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless... the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected" and the client consents after being informed of the risks).
Those union leaders whom the suit accused of wrongdoing would presumably
be incapable of giving effective consent. See id. Rule 1.13 cmt. 11 (discussing
derivative actions).
94. Yablonski, 454 F.2d at 1040-42.
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The drafters of the Model Business Act and the Yablonski
court were interested neither in the organizational structures
in which lawyers should practice nor in how lawyer-workplaces
should be structured. Their aim was to identify the workplaces
from which corporations and unions should select lawyers for
tasks that pose special interference risks. They were working
the "interferer" side of the regulatory street by developing the
law of corporate and union governance. The institutions of professional self-regulation were beside the point.
One structural measure that might protect independent
professional judgment is to place all of a company's in-house
lawyers within a unified legal department rather than assign
them to various line departments, such as marketing, where
they must report to nonlawyers. Lloyd Cutler stressed the importance of this over twenty years ago. "Unfortunately," he
wrote,
[MIany corporations are so committed to the line principle of organization that they require lawyers assigned to every operating division... to report directly to the Chief Executive of that division...
with only a "dotted line" connecting them to the general counsel ....
Lawyers placed in this position can tend to identify themselves too
closely with the business objectives of their line superiors.... In some
recent corporate payment investigations, we have found that lawyers... at the division or subsidiary level were so co-opted that they
actually participated in the drafting of invoices and agreements that
they knew to be false, and never consulted or informed their colleagues at the general counsel level. In our view, corporations could
greatly improve their own legal auditing procedures by establishing a
single group of lawyers, headed by the Corporate General Counsel,
who serve the management of every division.., in the same way that
a law firm serves its various clients ....1

Many large companies now follow Cutler's advice. 96 But
the "internal law firm" has evolved without regulatory pressure. Neither the ABA nor the state supreme courts have even
thought to make it an ethical precondition to in-house practice.97 Nor do ethics rules spell out any procedures that corpo95. Lloyd Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 BUS. LAW. 1549,
1550-51 (1978).
96. See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT

WORK 74 (1986) (reporting on case studies of five corporate law departments,
each of which turned out to be "a fully independent entity headed by a general
counsel").
97. Referring back the BB scenario, note that if separate departments
were an ethical requirement for large MDPs, it is unclear whether BB's "separate" Law Division would qualify since BB's lawyer's are also assigned to regional offices managed by nonlawyers.
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rations must use to guard against managerial impairment of
counsel's ability to exercise independent judgment. 98 Such paternalism on behalf of corporate clients would be misplaced. It
is also unlikely that the ABA and state supreme courts could
outdo corporate clients at finding cost-justified ways to minimize interference with counsel's judgment on their behalf.
Moreover, companies have every reason to implement voluntarily any worthwhile techniques they discover.
Though not employed by their clients, MDP lawyers face
comparable risks of interference with. One can certainly
imagine a lay manager pressing them to disserve clients in
some way that furthers his own ends or those of the MDP.
Sensitive to the problem, the Commission has sought public
comment on whether "fully integrated MDPs" should be required to organize their lawyers who provide legal services to
the public as a "separate legal division headed by a lawyer,"99
i.e., as a law firm within an MDP. The Commission also welcomes comment on whether to mandate any "specific procedures" in order to "safeguard lawyer independence." 1°° In other
words, the Commission will entertain proposals to require
structural protections for MDP lawyers that corporations have
never been required to provide for in-house lawyers.
To evaluate the case for imposing such restrictions on
MDPs, consider the fact that the clients of Big Five-type MDPs
will usually resemble, and often will be, the same businesses
that employ corporate counsel. If companies can be left to their
own devices in guarding against internal interference with
house counsel's judgment on their behalf, they can be expected
to monitor MDPs to discourage lay interference with the lawyers working on their matters, just as they use house counsel to
monitor the outside law firms they retain. Mandatory safeguards seem no more necessary for MDPs with sophisticated
clients' 01 than the ABA and state supreme courts have ever
98. Administrative regulations have been proposed, however, to govern
interactions between a public corporation and its federal securities lawyers.
In 1979, the SEC circulated for public comment a rule that would have required those companies to report to the SEC the circumstances surrounding
any dismissal of its general counsel or other lawyer in connection with SEC
matters. See SEC Release No. 34-16045, 44 Fed. Reg. 44881, 44882 (1979).
99.

UPDATE, supra note 6.

100. Id.
101. Of course, many smaller MDPs will have a different clientele. Conceivably, client sophistication could become a significant variable in MDP
regulation, just as the SEC has made "the sophisticated investor" a term of
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considered them to be for companies that employ house counsel.
b. Interference By
This brings us to interference by. Suppose GC, the general
counsel, is defending Bigcorp in a civil suit. The CEO orders
GC to remove damaging documents from a file before producing
the file in response to a discovery order. 0 2 GC recognizes that
removing the documents will increase the odds of winning the
case, with little downside risk of detection. But he is loathe to
follow an order that calls for unlawful conduct and the breach
of ethical duties to nonclients. 10 3 When GC demurs, the CEO
threatens to fire him. GC relents and removes the documents.
GC has allowed the CEO to interfere with his exercise of independent professional judgment.
What was interfered with, however, was not judgment on
behalf of the client. The rights GC was at first moved to protect
were those of the court' °4 and the opposing party. 0 5 It was legitimate, even obligatory, to resist the CEO on behalf of those
nonclients, even if, by GC's own lights, resistance would be
costly to Bigcorp. It follows that managers can impair the exercise of professional judgment by pressing counsel to compromise duties to the client or duties to nonclients. Because the
latter brand of interference occurs in a misguided effort to furlegal art in the regulation of securities broker-dealers. See National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs Endorse MDPs, supra note 27, at 1543, 1545 (suggesting that the bar approve broader use of conflicts waivers in cases involving
sophisticated clients, as judged by standards similar to SEC's conception of
"sophisticated investors"); see also APPENDIX A, supra note 5 (Model Rule 5.8
cmt. 6) (noting that relatively few safeguards will be necessary to ensure that
sophisticated clients understand when the MDP is rendering legal and nonlegal services).
102. For a similar case, see Herbster v. North Am. Co., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill.
App. 1986).
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983) (forbidding lawyers unlawfully to conceal or destroy evidence in a pending law-

suit).
104. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(2) (barring failure to "disclose a material fact to a
tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client").
105. See id. Rule 3.4(a) (barring, on grounds of fairness to an opposing
party, unlawful obstruction or concealment of documents having potential evidentiary value). Destruction or concealment of the documents would violate
discovery law and constitute knowingly assisting the client in defrauding the
court and the opposing party in violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d).
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ther client interests, one tends to view an interferer like Bigcorp's CEO not as an unfaithful agent of the company, but as
its alter ego. This is interference by the client.106
House counsel's interference by problem has an interesting
regulatory history. Much of Europe doubts the inside counsel's
ability or resolve to respect the nonclient rights or societal interests that lawyers are expected to honor. The view is that no
lawyer whose livelihood depends on satisfying a single company
can be trusted to exercise independent judgment on behalf of
nonclient rights. Accordingly, some European countries "disbar" lawyers while they work in-house. 10 7 (Whether the disbarred may do in-house legal work under another designation,
such as "business jurist," is an entirely different question. Often, they may.) 08 Other countries withdraw the mantle of the
attorney-client privilege from house counsel's communications
with management. 10 9
Though once frowned upon by bar leaders as vaguely unprofessional," 10 house counsel have always been accepted in the
United States""-testimony, perhaps, to the power of corporate
106. To the extent that law treats crimes committed by corporate agents to
increase company profits as contrary to the interests of the corporation, the
conceptual distinction between interference with and interference by collapses.
Yet, the distinction may remain important at the phenomenological level, i.e.,
in terms of the lawyer's perception of the nature of the problem and the reasons for the interference.
107. See Theofanis Christoforou, Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 18 & n.56
(1985-1986).
108. See LEUBSDORF, supra note 79, at 26. Notice the analogy between the
lawyers who choose to go in-house in Europe and give up the right to designate themselves as lawyers, on the one hand, and the American lawyers who
go to work in a Big Five firm in order to do "tax" work or "environmental consulting" and no longer hold themselves out as practicing law. One wonders if
lawyer regulation in the United States is drifting toward a designation rather
than a licensing system.
109. See Christoforou, supra note 107, at 2.
110. Even today, corporate counsel remain sensitive to policies that suggest
mistrust of their ability to conform to professional norms. See, e.g., Larry
Lempert, Bar Hammerlock on Inside Counsel Creates a Mess, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1986, at 2, available in LEXIS, Individual Legal News File (reporting
opposition of American Corporate Counsel Association (ACCA) to a proposal to
bar insurance companies from using staff attorneys to represent insureds;
ACCA argued that "any ruling which would limit the practice of inside counsel
would directly question the professionalism of that segment of the bar" (internal citation omitted)).
111. The attorney-client privilege in the United States protects corporate
counsel's communications with the client as well, but the applicability of the
privilege is complicated by the fact that many inside lawyers have business as
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America to structure its lawyer-client relationships as it sees
fit. Although the state supreme courts have never barred
house counsel arrangements, Americans have not been oblivious to the risk of interference by powerful corporate clients.
Early in the twentieth century, leading Progressives complained that lawyers for the "trusts," many of them inside
counsel, were too close to their clients to practice with due regard for the public interest. 112 Later, commentators extolled
the large law firm with diverse client portfolio as the antidote
13
to house counsel's dependency.
As in the case of interference with, some specialized law
has developed to guard against house counsel's vulnerability to
interference by. Again, I offer two examples, neither of which
has much to do with professional self-regulation. First, in adjudicating international trade and federal procurement disputes, 114 federal tribunals sometimes permit counsel, in preparing a client's case, to examine a competing company's
proprietary data. Though a protective order bars counsel from
sharing the data with management, the tribunals have been
reluctant to accept in-house lawyers as counsel for these purposes. To do so, according to the Court of International Trade,
poses an unacceptable risk of "'disclosure within the corporate
setting,"' 5 which would breach counsel's duty to the tribunal.
Nothing personal, of course: the court's preference for outside
counsel "is not based on any reservation as to the integrity of
in-house counsel"; rather, it "is intended to avoid placing them
under the unnatural and unremitting strain of having to exercise constant self-censorship in their normal working relawell as legal responsibilities. Only communications pertinent to legal advice
or legal services are protected. See generally Amber Stevens, Comment, An
Analysis of the TroublingIssues SurroundingIn-House Counsel and the Attorney-ClientPrivilege, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 289 (1999).
112. See Gordon, supra note 7, at 2-3 (quoting Louis Brandeis and
Woodrow Wilson).
113. See,

e.g.,

ERWIN

0.

SMIGEL,

THE

WALL

STREET

LAWYER:

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 342 (1964) (agreeing with sociologist Talcott Parsons that the size and diversification of large law firms increases their
client base and autonomy from their clients, enabling them to act as "a kind of
buffer between the illegitimate desires of... clients and the social interest").
114. See Sol Glasner, New Breed of D.C. Lawyers? In-Housers Come Out of
the Cold, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1988, at 20, available in LEXIS, Individual
Legal News File (discussing the problem in context of disputes involving federal procurement issues).
115. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 870, 873 (Ct.
Int'l Trade), modified, 578 F. Supp. 415 (Ct. Intl Trade 1983).
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tions." 116 Second, courts have begun to permit house counsel to
in
sue their employers if they are fired for refusing to engage
117
unlawful conduct or for insisting on compliance with law.
Again, these doctrines address corporate employers. By
contrast, no state supreme court has considered auditing corporate employers for possible interference, "decertifying" those
companies that are found guilty of interference, and barring
lawyers from working in-house for decertified companies.
Interference by may not be as controllable through intracorporate processes as interference with, since the former occurs in pursuing putative client interests at the expense of
third-party rights. 118 Nevertheless, the case for proactively
regulating corporate employers to control this risk would be
weak even if the scheme were practical. Though the point
seems counter-intuitive, economic theory suggests that inhouse lawyers may sometimes possess more leverage than outside counsel over corporate clients. 119 At a minimum, they do
not appear to face greater risks of interference by than lawyers
in "captive" law firms-i.e., "outside" firms whose revenues

116. Id. at 871 (quoting Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust.
Court. 133, C.R.D. 80-18 (1980)).
117. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487,490
(Cal. 1994) (en banc) (permitting in-house counsel to proceed with claims
against arms contractor that allegedly fired him for insisting on investigating
an internal security breakdown that may have jeopardized national security
interests). Professional self-regulation can play a supporting role in such
cases because lawyer-plaintiffs can cite rules of legal ethics to justify the "insubordination" that led to their termination as house counsel.
118. One might draw this inference from the fact that the majority of serious civil claims against large law firms, which tend to represent big business,
are filed by third-party victims, not by clients. See Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 328
(1989); see also JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS'

UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 206-07 (1978) (discussing
problems with the disciplinary system).
119. If a lawyer's expertise becomes highly client-specific, as is often true of
in-house counsel, the relationship takes on the features of a bilateral monopoly. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26-29 (1975) (discussing opportunism and how it
impacts behavior); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the
Human Capitalists:An Economic Inquiry Into the CorporateLaw Firm and
How PartnersSplit Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 358-60 (1985). On one hand,
the lawyer's job mobility, and thus his leverage over the client, tends to decline
because other employers place a relatively low value on his services. On the
other, his expertise becomes relatively costly for the current client to replace,
thereby increasing his leverage. The net effect on the locus of power in the
relationship is unpredictable.
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come wholly or largely from one client. 120 It is not even clear
that in-house lawyers are at greater risk of interference by
than the many law-firm partners whose firms have a nicely diversified portfolio of clients, but who themselves work largely
account and depend on it to maintain their value
on one client's 121
to their firms.
In short, no case can be made for active supreme court
oversight of house-counsel settings in order to prevent interference by. Since MDP lawyers have a broader client base than
house counsel, it is hard to see why active judicial oversight
would be more appropriate for them. Indeed, if house counsel
are all too vulnerable to interference by, MDPs may be part of
the solution, since many will be retained to do corporate legal
work that would otherwise go to house counsel.
3. Lay Intermediaries
Next, consider our regulatory experience with "lay" organizations that employ lawyers to provide legal services to others.
These include liability insurers, other "corporate intermediaries," legal services offices, and group legal services plans.
a. Staff Attorney Programsfor Defending Insureds
Some liability insurers retain outside lawyers to defend
their insureds; others employ staff attorneys. The staff attorney is only marginally different from house counsel since the
insurer-employer has its own stake in the defense and may be a
co-client with the insured, rather than a mere third-party

120. One of the most sustained bouts of unethical lawyering in recent decades involved a New York law firm that remained willfully blind to the massive frauds it helped its flagship client, OPM, commit over several years. OPM
accounted for over sixty percent of the law firm's revenues for the period, producing what was "virtually a captured law firm." ROBERT P. GANDOSSY, BAD
BUSINESS: THE OPM SCANDAL AND THE SEDUCTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

221 (1985); see also In re Keating, Muething & Kiekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124, at
81,981 (July 2, 1979) (imposing SEC "discipline" on a boutique law firm whose
lawyers all did transactional work for the firm's largest client and which

helped the client prepare disclosure statements to the SEC which unlawfully
omitted material facts about the client's transactions with its self-dealing
principals).
121. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FRM 250 (1988) (finding that large-firm
lawyers who do corporate work in Chicago devote over half their time on average to their largest client).
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payor. 122 New problems arise in this setting, however, because
the company's interests can come into conflict with the insured's. In that event, counsel is understood to owe the insured
all the professional duties that run to a client, including duties
of competence, loyalty, and confidentiality. 123 Yet the staff attorney's vulnerability to insurer interference with her professional judgment on behalf of the insured is palpable, 124 though
perhaps not palpably greater than that of retained counsel who
come to depend on an insurer's continuing patronage.
Just what constitutes interference in this context remains
surprisingly unclear, even with respect to recurring issues such
122. Whether the lawyer should be deemed to have one client or two, and
just what rides on the answer, has been much debated. Compare Robert E.
O'Malley, Ethics Principlesfor the Insurer,the Insured, and Defense Counsel:
The Eternal TriangleReformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511, 512 (1991) (favoring only
one-client theory on policy grounds), with Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583,
1590-91 (1994) (arguing that if insured and insurer both consent to be represented, then they are both clients as a matter of agency law, and that this is
desirable as a matter of public policy). See generally Nancy J. Moore, The
EthicalDuties of InsuranceDefense Counsel: Are Special Solutions Required?,
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259 (1997) (concluding that insureds should be informed
that their attorney is a salaried employee of the insurance company). One
thing is clear: whether defense counsel has one client or two is not determined
by the rules of legal ethics.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Scope J 3 (1983) (stating that "principles of substantive law
external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists"). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 215 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) (treating the issue as a matter of insurance law), with id. § 26 (providing an acontextual rule on the formation of
lawyer-client relationships that turns solely on mutual consent or a lawyer's
creating in the client's mind a reasonable expectation that the lawyer was representing him).
123. See, e.g., Parsons v. Continental Natl Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 98
(Ariz. 1976) (en banc) (barring insurer from contesting coverage on basis of information the insured gave to defense counsel, who then breached duty of confidentiality to insured by revealing it to company; whether insurer was a client
was irrelevant because duty to insured was superior in any event, and counsel
was serving insurer only as liability, not coverage, counsel). The Model Rules
recognize that insurance defense work raises difficult issues but do not specify
rules for the field. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7
cmt. 10 (referring generally to need to maintain insurance defense counsel's
"professional independence").
124. Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his
efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interests of his real client-the
one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future
business-the insurance company.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938
n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
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as whether counsel may accept an insurer's restrictions on expenditures for investigation and discovery, an issue raised as
well by the BB scenario in Part 1.125 Rules of legal ethics "afford little specific assistance" on such issues. 126 Some ethics
opinions provide more guidance, 127 but they often conflict and
are not binding on courts and disciplinary agencies. 128 Many of
our expectations of insurance defense counsel are derived not
from ethics rules, but from insurance law, contract terms,
guidelines negotiated by ABA officials and insurance representatives, 29 and lawsuits against defense counsel who allegedly
succumbed to interference or insurers who allegedly interfered. 130 Professional self-regulation-i.e., legal ethics rules as
interpreted in advisory ethics opinions-can do no more than
vie with other kinds of authority to define the role of the lawyer
within the "tripartite relationship." 13 1 The other authorities
recognize lawyer independence as a good, but are less likely to
treat it as the only relevant good or as an absolute that brooks
no compromise. In view of the palpable risk of interference and
the inability of the bar and state supreme courts to devise and
enforce protocols that can be trusted to prevent it, the question
has arisen whether the state supreme courts should bar lawyers from participating in insurers' staff attorney programs on
the grounds of undue and uncontrollable interference risk.

125. Ethics opinions have reached inconsistent conclusions. Compare ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996)
(permitting a lawyer to represent an insured under a policy giving the insurer
exclusive control of the defense, provided the lawyer explains the limited nature of the representation to the insured), with Alabama State Bar, Formal
Op. RO-98-02 (1998), available at <http://www.alabar.org> (holding under
similar ethics rules that counsel should remain independent of insurer's direction on such matters, regardless of policy terms).
126. WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 429.
127. See supra note 125 (citing examples of ethics opinions addressing insurance representation issues).
128.

See Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in

Perspective,44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 82 & n.8 (1975).
129. See, e.g., National Conference of Laws. & Liab. Insurers, Liability Insurers Guiding Principles,in 7 MARTINDALE HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 76M,
77M (1978). The ABA repealed some "inter-group treaties" in 1980 "in the
face of threats of antitrust charges." WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 429 n.97.
130. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 197-98 (Ala. 1988)
(validating an insurance contract giving the insurer the right to settle a malpractice case within policy limits, and concluding that counsel acted properly
in settling the case as the insurer instructed, despite insured's objection).
131. Id. at 198 (discussing the nature of the tripartite relationship).
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Two courts have found that the staff attorney model,
though perhaps useful for controlling costs, unduly jeopardizes
counsels ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of
insureds. The practice of retaining "outside" counsel to handle
all of an insurer's cases for a flat fee, which (compared to hourly
fees) motivates counsel to invest less time per case, has also
come under scrutiny. 132 Following the lead of the state bar association, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently declared both
practices so threatening to counsel's independent judgment as
to constitute interference per se under prevailing ethics rules;
the North Carolina Supreme Court takes the same position as
to staff attorneys. 133 Their claim is not that these structures
132. In a recent article, Jeffrey Stempel decries the stringent measures insurers have taken in recent years to control defense costs by controlling defense lawyers. See Jeffrey Stempel, EmbracingDescent: The Bankruptcy of a
Business Paradigmfor Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 100-05 (1999). He criticizes as the equivalent of
"managed care" the use of "billing rules for attorneys that attempt to circumscribe counsel's professional judgment by setting limits on discovery activity,
legal research, consultation, retention of expert witnesses, and time spent on
case preparation." Id. at 101. He also welcomes the lawsuit that a defense
counsel recently brought before the Montana supreme court, which agreed to
hear the case as a trial court." See id. at 101 & n.298 (citing news sources).
The plaintiffs, he writes, challenge the "billing restrictions as impermissible
intrusions on their professional judgment," and seek a declaratory judgment
"that such guidelines violate the rules of professional conduct and thus the
lawyers need not abide by" them. Id. (emphasis added). I have three reactions.
First, I wish Professor Stempel had come to grips with the common objection that insurers took these steps in reaction to the overbilling they consider
all to common when defense lawyers are paid on an hourly basis and given a
blank check for expenses. One hopes that defense attorneys have not exploited their "duty to exercise independent professional judgment" in the past
to extract greater fees and more working latitude than their task requires. I
am not competent to make that assessment; Professor Stempel apparently is.
He reports that insurers "have always driven relatively hard bargains with
defense counsel," are "notorious for negotiating low hourly rates," and "have
long been considered to excessively scrutinize their bills." Id. But, one wonders, hard bargains compared to what? Notorious in what circles? Considered
excessive by whom?
Second, Stempel shifts in mid-argument from calling the billing practices
in question "restrictions" to calling them "guidelines." Id. These are hardly
synonyms. To consider whether billing policies constitute "interference," one
should examine them and their likely consequences, not rely on tendentious
characterizations. And third, the Montana case is an interesting prototype of
the lawsuits MDP lawyers may someday bring to protect or establish their independence.
133. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 572
(Ky. 1996) (finding, first, that the flat fee model, like the staff attorney model,
"interferes with the exercise of the attorney's independent professional judg-
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invariably lead to interference or cloud counsers judgment,
134
merely that banning them to eliminate the risk is desirable.
With no more than anecdotal evidence on hand, 135 however,
these courts were hardly in a position to assess the risk (not to
mention any offsetting benefits) 13 6 reliably enough to justify
such drastic prophylaxis. The courts appear to have decided
instead that this practice arrangement is intolerable if it carries any risk, as of course it does.
But, intolerable compared to what? To the outside defense
lawyer who spends eighty percent of her time on cases for a
single insurer? Fifty percent? The problem is that interference
risk in insurance defense work is not a dichotomous variablestaff attorney, yes; outside counsel, no. Nothing is magical
about the one-hundred percent line. To draw the line at one
hundred percent is to outlaw an organizational structure that
the insurance industry, itself highly regulated, finds useful.
State supreme courts may claim "exclusive" constitutional
authority to regulate law practice, especially where litigation is
involved. But it does not follow that they have the political
authority or the technical expertise to issue what amounts to
structural injunctions against the insurance industry. Catement, in contravention of Rule 1.8(f)(2)" and gives the attorney "an interest in
the outcome of the action" which conflicts with his duties to the client, namely
the incentive to maximize profits by devoting minimal time to cases); Gardner
v. North Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517, 522-23 (N.C. 1986) (criticizing
the staff-attorney model in similar terms).
134. See American Ins. Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d at 573 (stating that the "mere
appearance of impropriety is just as egregious as any actual or real conflict,"
and that the ban "acts as a prophylactic device").
135. Here, as with legal aid societies, see infra text accompanying notes
168-70, Americans have had considerable experience with insurers' staffattorney programs. But there has been little research on the nature and magnitude of interference problems that arise. Perhaps the ABA House of Delegates, which has resolved not to support MDP legalization until further study
"demonstrates" that MDP lawyers will be able to exercise independent judgment, would care to fund studies of this sort. Of course, such studies are hard
to conduct in the absence of consensus about what actually constitutes interference, either in general or in MDPs specifically.
136. Benefits might include cost savings that could be passed on to policyholders in the form of reduced premiums, as well the staff attorney's greater
opportunity to gain expertise in the specialty, and gain it faster, than outside
counsel with more diversified practices. Because of its duty to oversee the litigation process, a state supreme court is less likely to consider the interests of
policyholders here than the defendant-insured's interest in receiving adequate
representation. Yet each post-accident defendant was a pre-accident insured
who, given the choice, might well have preferred to pay a lower premium in
return for accepting representation from a staff attorney if necessary.
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gorically barring lawyers from practice in certain organizational structures means regulating not just lawyers, but lawyers' interactionswith other fundamental institutions-the insurance industry here, the accounting profession vis-A-vis
MDPs, the federal government vis-h-vis legal services programs.
Fortunately, the weight of authority is to the contrary.
Eleven states are unwilling to outlaw the staff attorney model
on ethical or TJPL grounds. 137 Nor has any state attempted to
specify procedures that must be used in order to bring the
model into "ethical compliance," or to audit staff attorney programs as a safeguard against interference. Most courts recognize that their competence to second-guess insurer-designed incentive structures for defense counsel is doubtful. 138 They also
regard as adequate safeguards against interference an insured's rights upon being victimized to (1) sue counsel for malpractice; (2) sue a negligent staff attorney's employer on a vicarious liability theory; and (3) sue the insurer directly for bad
faith when there is demonstrable, case-specific interference. 139
These ex post remedies compensate clients who are victimized
by interference and leave it to insurers to decide whether staff
attorney programs are justified in light of their liability costs.
Where the staff attorney model is lawful, its use should
have no bearing in itself on insurer liability. The link between
a lawyer's employee status and any deficiencies in his representation of an insured will normally be too murky to justify
insurer liability. 140 Nor will it be necessary to establish such a
See UPDATE, supra note 6.
138. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 951, 953 (Mo. 1987)
(holding that neither a statute banning the practice of law by corporations nor
the conflict-of-interest provisions of the prevailing ethics code militate against
an insurer's use of staff attorneys).
139. See id. at 953. Agency law normally treats retained outside lawyers
as independent contractors but staff attorneys as servants, whose malpractice
is imputable to their employer. Consequently, insurers will have an incentive
to abandon the staff attorney model if experience shows that it promotes attorney negligence or breach of fiduciary duties to insureds. At the same time,
the staff attorney's ethical duties to the insured afford her some latitude in
representing the insured even though her legal status as servant implies that
she is under the insurer's control.
140. Theories of corporate or organizational negligence are also unnecessary and unhelpful when law firms are sued for malpractice. Suppose client C
relies to his detriment on an unsound legal opinion prepared by L, a junior
partner at Firm. If C sues Firm for malpractice, his theory against the firm
will almost certainly be vicarious liability for L's breach of the professional
standard of care in preparing the opinion. No theory of "corporate" or "struc137.
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link to recover from the insurer, which will be vicariously liable
for a staff attorney's malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty to
an insured. On the other hand, interference in a specific case
should support insurer liability for bad faith whether the lawyer is a staff attorney or not 14 1-for example, when a claims
administrator induced counsel to defend X's case weakly in order to achieve an outcome that would justify the company in
canceling X's policy.
The prevailing willingness to rely primarily on civil liability to control the risks of interference in insurance defense
work seems wise. A state supreme court ban on all staff attorney programs (without auditing a single one!) ignores the possibility that most, for their own good, work out adequate antiinterference procedures. Besides, however great their opportunities may be, insurers have no discernible motive to interfere
in the mine-run of cases in which claims are within policy limits and raise no coverage issues. With respect to discovery
costs, for instance, they will not be penny-wise and poundfoolish with their own money. 142
Finally, defendants in professional malpractice cases often
complain that defense counsel (employed or retained) follow
their insurer's instructions to settle (within policy limits), without seeking the insured's consent or giving the insured a
chance to convince the company to reconsider. They worry
about the effects of settlement on their reputations, which insurers allegedly disregard. But the scenario involves no wrongful interference if, as a matter of insurance law, policies that
authorize the insurer to make settlement decisions are deemed
tural" negligence will be raised. C is unlikely to argue, for example, that a
reasonable law firm would have had a policy, as Firm did not, requiring legal
opinions to be reviewed by an opinion committee before leaving the firm. Even
if C could show that this policy was customary and cost justified by its value in
reducing the risk of unsound opinions, C might find it hard to show specific
causation-i.e., that an opinion committee would have weeded out most unsound opinions and, by inference, this opinion.
141. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625,
629 (Tex. 1998) (stating that, although insurer is not vicariously liable to insured for malpractice by retained defense counsel, who is an independent contractor, insurer could be directly liable on a showing that it "consciously undermined the insured's defense").
142. For withering criticism of the Kentucky Supreme Court's economic
assumptions in declaring staff attorney and flat fee arrangements unethical,
see generally Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary
Casualtiesin the ContinuingBattle over the Law GoverningInsurance Defense
Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205 (1997).
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to waive the insured's right to control settlement as two courts
have held. 143 Another court insists that policy terms cannot alter the lawyer's ethical duty to elicit the insured client's consent before settling, 1' but there is little need for this protection.
The insurance market offers reputation-minded
professionals a solution: a more expensive malpractice policy
under which the insured retains control over settlement decisions.145
b. Corporateor "Lay"Intermediaries
Early in the twentieth century, other businesses and nonprofit organizations began to experiment with new ways to provide legal services to their members or to the broader public.
Many hired staff attorneys; others forwarded work to lawyers
who established no direct, let alone independent, relationships
with the parties served. These "corporate intermediaries" included automobile clubs, trust departments in banks, trade as147
sociations, 146 and collection agencies.
These experiments largely ceased once the states adopted
statutes prohibiting lay organizations (other than legal aid societies) from "practicing law" even if licensed attorneys provided the service. 148 These statutes were sometimes used to
enjoin intermediaries from continuing to offer legal services. 149
143. See Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 201 (Ala. 1988) (stating that
there is no conflict of interest when the insured has contracted away his right
to consent to a settlement); Feliberty v. Damon, 527 N.E.2d 261, 262 (N.Y.
1988) (concluding that "the parties' contract unambiguously gave the insurer
the unconditioned right to settle any claim").
144. See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund, & Belom, 407 N.E.2d
47, 49 (Ill. 1980) (stating that if the insured's consent is not forthcoming, then
the lawyer should withdraw rather than do the insurer's bidding and complete
the settlement).
145. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF

LAWYERING 639 (3d ed. 1999) (asking why insureds who forgo the option of
purchasing a more expensive policy in order to retain control over settlement
should be entitled to sue lawyers or insurers who settle their claims within
policy limits).
146. Some trade associations employed lawyers not only for their own legal
needs, but to serve their members as well.
147. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 80, at 230-48 (reviewing intermediary
arrangements for legal services).
148. See WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 840 (noting that most states have
statutes prohibiting the practice of law by corporations).
149. See, e.g., People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (1ll.
1931) (finding bank engaged in unauthorized practice of law); State ex rel.
Freebourn v. Merchants' Credit Serv., 66 P.2d 337, 343 (Mont. 1937) (same for
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In 1928, the ABA addressed the lawyer's side of the intermediary structure by adding Canon 35 to the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Canon 35 barred lawyers from allowing their services
to be "controlled or exploited by any lay agency... which intervenes between client and lawyer" or entering into any "relations which direct the performance of [their] duties in the interest of such intermediary." 50 Ethics opinions then construed
Canon 35, as well as Canon 47's ban on assisting others to engage in unauthorized practice, 15 ' to bar lawyers from practicing
in settings such as bank trust departments, where some lawyers drafted wills as a service to bank customers, 152 and accounting firms, which offered legal advice along with other
services for one fee. 53 Lawyers working with a corporate intermediary were occasionally disciplined for violating these
Canons. 154
The ABA's job was to make these ethical strictures effective at minimal enforcement cost to the state supreme courts
and to the state and local bar associations they deputized to
run the poorly funded disciplinary process and investigate UPL
complaints. Accordingly, the ABA began in 1937 to negotiate
"statements of principles" with associations representing other
collection agency); State v. James Sanford Agency, 69 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tenn.
1934) (same). Collection agencies tried to avoid the problem by taking assignments of debt obligations from creditors and filing suit against the debtors
in their own names. The aim was to transform collection agencies into clients
and their lawyers into house counsel. "Real party in interest" laws often foiled
this strategy. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Norvell v. Credit Bureau, 514 P.2d 40, 49
(N.M. 1973); Theodore J. Schneyer, Searchingfor New "Particles"in the Law
of Lawyering: Recent Developments in the Attribution of "Clienthood," 1 J.
INST. FOR STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 79 (1996) (commenting briefly on the use of
new "attributions of clienthood" to change the ethical analysis of lawyer conduct in several contexts).
150. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 35 (1929).
151. Id. Canon 47 (forbidding a lawyer to permit his professional services
to be "used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by
any lay agency).
152. See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 25 (n.d.), cited in VERN
COUNTRYMAN ET AL., THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY, 526-28 (2d ed. 1976)
(finding violations of Canons 35 and 47 where a lawyer drafted a will for a client of a trust company on the basis of a memo from a trust officer and without
consulting the testator).
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
297 (1961) (finding it irrelevant that an accountant with no lawyer's assistance lawfully could provide the same advice as a lawyer).
154. See, e.g., In re Droker, 370 P.2d 242, 248-49 (Wash. 1962) (suspending
from practice two lawyers who had provided legal services through an escrow
company).
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occupations at the national level.1 55 These "treaties" were expected to clarify the boundaries between law practice and other
services, 5 6 but were ineffective in that regard 57 They sometimes played a role in UPL litigation,' 58 but mainly served to
notify nonlawyers about UPL restrictions and to enlist their
trade or professional associations in the cause of UPL prevention, including the prevention of unauthorized practice through
intermediaries.' 59 The ABA also formed national conferences
with treaty partners to interpret treaties, monitor behavior,
and study new problems.160
These attempts at inter-professional regulation through
private ABA negotiations ceased by 1980.161 Treaties were rescinded and conferences disbanded in response to the growing
threat of federal antitrust suits. 162 Without the participation or
155. QURTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK
184-85 (1976) (listing occupations that made treaties with the ABA).
156. Some treaties, such as the 1937 Statement of Principles with collection agencies focused on the corporate intermediary problem. See id. at 185.
For decades, however, the ABA and the collection agencies continued to disagree about which arrangements constituted UPL by lay corporations. See
COUNTRYMAN ET AL., supra note 152, at 525-29.
157. If the agreement device is to be a substitute for litigation in the
unauthorized practice field,.., there must be many rulings as to what
the agreements mean when applied to particular fact situations....
The experience of the conference groups [as of 1955] gives little indication that this necessary interpretation function can be performed. Few
interpretations have been requested.., and there has been difficulty,
notably in the lawyer-accountant conference groups, in securing agreement on interpretations.
Quintin Johnstone, The UnauthorizedPracticeControversy,A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1955).
158. See e.g., State ex rel. Porter v. Alabama Ass'n of Credit Executives,
338 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. 1976) (relying on ABA treaty with committee of debt
collection agencies).
159. See Johnstone, supra note 157, at 3 (noting these desirable effects
from the ABA's standpoint).
160. See JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 155, at 185 n.71.
161. See WOLFRAM, supra note 42, at 826-27.
162. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-92 (1975) (denying state bars' protections under state action exemption of federal antitrust
laws and finding no "learned profession" exemption that would protect private
bar associations from antitrust liability for issuing anti-competitive fee schedules); Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298,
308-09 (E.D. Va. 1977) (holding that bar association opinions purporting to define areas of unauthorized practice violate antitrust laws); Trustbusters Eye
ABA UPL Opinion, 63 A.B.A. J. 1702 (1977) (noting that federal officials were
threatening further antitrust suits to counter bars' UPL activities); NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 26, 1979, at 29 (announcing a Justice Department suit against a county
bar association for conspiring to restrain trade through statement of princi-
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approval of the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission, this tradition is unlikely to be revived. For example, the ABA and AICPA are unlikely to draw up a "treaty" containing principles to protect lawyer independence in MDPs controlled by accountants.1 63 Still, the ABA's campaign to curb
corporate intermediaries through national agreements is worth
keeping in mind when contemplating the prospects for MDP
regulation under the Commission's system. It suggests that
state supreme courts and state bars were too weak to shut
down all intermediaries through state-by-state UPL enforcement.'6 As Professors Quintin Johnstone and Dan Hopson,
Jr., observed in 1955, this weakness reflected not only the lack
of enforcement dollars and personnel, but the fact that the
"major competing groups are respected and established businesses" and "can be counted on to use their financial and political resources to oppose the bar on unauthorized practice whenever threatened."' 65 Foremost among those competitors were
accounting firms, who even then were helping businesses to
prepare and66file incorporation papers, in addition to rendering
tax advice.'
Today's MDP-like activities at the Big Five are dgjb& vu all
over again. It would be vastly more difficult today to wage
state-by-state UPL campaigns against the Big Five for operating MDPs, which are simply a modern variation on the corporate intermediary theme. The reason is not just money. State
bars cannot deliver strong UPL enforcement without a consensus on the matter among their own members.' 6 7 If that was
possible in the 1950s, it seems impossible now, with substantial
bar constituencies favoring MDP legalization, including the
lawyers who work for the Big Five.
Providing legal services through corporate intermediaries
remains illegal, and it is still a breach of legal ethics for lawyers to cooperate in such ventures. But holding the legal line
has come at a price. Ethics enforcers cannot have learned
ples).
163. See Roth, Bar Going Nowhere Fast on MDPs, supra note 31, at 20
(quoting executive director of American Antitrust Institute to the effect that,
"[i]f the ABA continues to hold out against the possibility of a more competitive environment, they will be opening up the potential for [antitrust] suits").
164.

165.
166.
167.
see id.

See JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 155, at 189-92.

Id. at 189, 193.
See id. at 193.
On the importance of lawyers' support and the problem of gaining it,
at 187-89.
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much about the nature and control of interference risks in corporate intermediaries-information that in principle could help
them gauge the magnitude and preventability of those risks in
MDPs. And, since the ban is only loosely enforced, they have
also had to ignore behavior that is much unethical or illegal.
c. Legal Aid Societies and Legal Services Programs
Barlow Christensen wrote in 1970 (surely, without MDPs
in mind) that the legal profession had "long recognized that differing circumstances and changing conditions may sometimes
call for different forms of organization in law practice." 168 Legal
aid societies--charitable organizations providing legal assistance to the poor-have long been an accepted if deviant form.
So are the federally-funded legal services programs that many
legal aid societies turned into after 1965. Yet most legal aid
and legal services programs are structured like corporate intermediaries. They rely on staff attorneys working under
boards of directors that include lay members and, in some
cases, under lay office directors as well. 169 Although they are
nonprofit organizations, their board members' political agenda
could easily substitute for the business objectives of lay managers as a motive to interfere. 170 Why, then, have the ABA and
state supreme courts tolerated these structures rather than
treating them, like other corporate intermediaries, as interference per se?
168.

CHRISTENSEN, supra note 80, at 226.

169. See id. "Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent" were exempt from the strictures of Canon 35, which simply deemed them not to be
"intermediaries." Id. at 226 n.4; see also Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society, 185
N.E.2d 566, 569-71 (Ohio 1962) (affirming ruling that legal aid society was not
an intermediary engaged in UPL, but a nonprofit corporation that provided
lawyers who formed personal lawyer-client relationships with indigents).
170. In a 1978 Supreme Court decision, then-Justice Rehnquist made a
similar point about the solicitation of legal clients by nonprofit organizations:
I cannot share the Court's confidence that the danger.., is minimized simply because a lawyer proceeds from political conviction
rather than for pecuniary gain. A State may reasonably fear that a
lawyer's desire to resolve "substantial civil liberties questions" may
occasionally take precedence over his duty to advance the interests of
his client.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 445 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (criticizing decision to protect ACLU lawyer from state supreme court
discipline for solicitation based on First Amendment distinction between forprofit solicitation and solicitation to further political aims through litigation).
Much the same could be said of the potential motives of legal services board
members to "interfere."
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Christensen cites two reasons. First, "the social value of
an organized and effective method of providing legal services to
indigent clients far outweighs any risk of diluting or impairing
the lawyer-client relationship."' 7 ' Second, experience has demonstrated that "the lawyer-client relationship can be adequately preserved in legal aid programs." 17 2 Tolerance, of
course, is what permitted that experience in the first place.
The federal government began to fund legal services programs in 1964.173 Both before and immediately after the National Legal Services Corporation was created in 1975,174 staffattorney programs were funded more generously than voucher
programs, which permit qualifying clients to choose their own
lawyers. Indeed, federal officials openly preferred the staffattorney structure, though it ostensibly posed greater interference risks. 7 5 Some bar associations resisted this policy, 17 6 but
171. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 80, at 227 (emphasis added). One wonders
why the same kind of risk-benefit analysis should not be used to decide
whether to legalize MDPs, which many consider an "organized and effective
way" to serve non-indigent clients. True, there will be much argument about
the nature and extent of both risks and benefits. But why tolerate practice
settings that put a lawyer's independent judgment on behalf of clients at risk
only when the clients who will suffer if the risk materializes are poor and legally unsophisticated? Is the Anti-Interference Principle only one value to
balance against others in judging the acceptability of legal services programs,
but an absolute where MDPs are concerned?
Another factor in the bar's tolerance of legal aid societies may have been
the perception that they did not compete for clients with private practitioners.
Legal aid has generally provided service in civil matters such as landlordtenant and debtor-creditor disputes. The society in New York City has also
provided counsel for indigent criminal defendants, while most communities
have separate pubic defender offices or assigned counsel systems for criminal
defendants. Early studies of criminal defense programs for indigents showed
that the assigned counsel system was more expensive and that staff attorneys
in public defenders' offices developed more relevant expertise than assigned
counsel. See L. RAY PATTERSON & ELLIOTr E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION
OF LAW 336-37 (1971).
172. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 80, at 227.
173. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 39-70 (1974).
174. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355.
175. See JOHNSON, supra note 173, at 89-90, 117-21 (1974). There was also
early support for lay membership on the boards of directors of legal services
programs, but federal officials eventually acceded to organized bar entreaties
to require a lawyer-majority on each board. See id. at 121-26.
176. For example, the North Carolina Bar briefly issued rulings suggesting
that lawyers employed by a federally-funded legal services office under the
existing federal regulations were violating ethics rules and could be disciplined. See id. at 89-90. The Wisconsin State Bar successfully campaigned for
funds to administer its Judicare program, a voucher plan. See id. at 117-18.
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no state supreme court ever told the federal government that
its staff attorney programs amounted to the unlawful practice
of law by an intermediary and that staff attorneys were ipso
77
facto in violation of local ethics rules.1
Since legal services programs using staff attorneys were
lawful, ABA ethics opinions tried to work out the implications
of the Anti-Interference Principle for relations between lawyers
and management in those programs. Here, at last, was a
chance for the machinery of professional self-regulation to
elaborate on the meaning of interference in a workplace where
lawyers were lawfully employed by lay intermediaries. The results have not been impressive.
The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 restricted the
legal services that federally-funded programs could offer: for
example, lawyers could only file class actions for clients if doing
so was permissible under a policy established by their program's board and the actions were specifically approved by the
program director. 178 A staff attorney who thought a client's
case should be turned into a class action could not proceed
without the approval of the director, who might or might not be
a lawyer. Was this consistent with the Anti-Interference Principle?
An ABA informal opinion had held in 1972 that such a requirement would be impermissible in light of DR 5-107(B) of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which required
lawyers not to permit a lay employer to "direct or regulate
[their] professional judgment." 179 The implication was that
even a lawyer-supervisor is a potential interferer. Just before
Congress passed the Act, however, ABA Formal Opinion 334
overruled that holding in favor of the following position:
Staff lawyers of a legal services office are subject to the direction of
and control of senior lawyers ... or the executive director (if a lawyer)....just as associates of any law firm are subject to the direction
and control of their seniors. Such internal communication and control

177. Doing so would have implicated serious federalism issues. Moreover,
the ABA became a major supporter of the new federal legal services programstaff-attorney model or not--even though many state and local associations
were opposed. See id. at 49-64.
178. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355,
§ 1006(d)(5).
179. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1232 (1972).
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is not only permissible but salutary. It is only control of the staff
lawyer's judgment by an external source that is improper.8 0

No analysis justified this reversal, which tried to make an
ethical virtue of a new federal necessity. Moreover, Opinion
334 failed to clarify several related issues, some of which also
appear in my BB scenario. What if the director is a lawyer, but
rejects the staff attorney's request purely on the basis of cost?
Is that an exercise of professional judgment by definition, because it is a lawyer's judgment? Just what may or must a staff
attorney do if a lay director, citing her duties under the Act, refuses to defer to the attorney's judgment regarding the class action? Suppose the board, consisting mostly of lawyers, ratifies
the lay director's decision? Would that justify the decision and
the staff attorney's acquiescence, or would the board constitute
an "external" source of control?
In 1970, ABA Formal Opinion 324 held that under the
Model Code a lawyer-board member had an ethical duty to oppose policies that interfere with the independent judgment of
staff attorneys in representing their clients.181 Yet the Code
contained enforceable "Disciplinary Rules" as well as aspirational "Ethical Considerations" and Opinion 324 never declared
whether the board member's duty in this instance was enforceable. Four years later, ABA Formal Opinion 334 tried but
failed to clarify the matter. 182 Opinion 334 asserted that earlier
committee statements on the duties of lawyer-board members
were based "for the most part" on disciplinary rules, but never
indicated whether this included the referenced holding in
Opinion 324.183 Indeed, Opinion 334 added to the confusion by
citing only a nonexistent Ethical Consideration to support its
position that, although boards could impose subject-matter restrictions on the cases their programs accepted,
priorities must be based on a consideration of the needs of the client
community and the resources available .... They may not be based
on considerations such as the identity of the prospective adverse parties or the nature of the remedy ("class action") sought to be employed.'1

The ABA ethics committee cannot have expected these
opinions to help enforcers identify and put a stop to any work180. Id. Formal Op. 334 (1974).
181. See id. Formal Op. 324 (1970).
182. See id. Formal Op. 334 (1974).
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing EC-1, though no such Ethical Consideration existed in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
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control policies in legal services offices that violate the AntiInterference Principle. Predictably, no state supreme courts
have enforced the Principle through disciplinary proceedings
against lawyer-board members or staff attorneys. Nor has any
court provided for "decertification" proceedings against offending programs.
Even as sources of guidance for lawyers associated with legal services programs, Opinions 324 and 334 were less than
satisfactory. Both indicate, for example, that a board may control intake decisions by adopting certain rules limiting the
categories of cases a program will accept and the types of service it will provide-for example, no divorce cases-but may not
make intake decisions on a "case-by-case, client-by-client" basis. 8 5 Case-by-case decisions would amount to an employer
"direct[ing] or regulatting a staff attorney's] professional judgment in rendering... legal services," in violation of DR 5107(B). 18 6 Some may find this distinction attractive as a means
to discourage boards from rejecting politically controversial
cases as they come in. 187 Others may find it presumptuous for
an ABA committee to tell legal services boards how federal
88
funds should be allocated through client intake decisions.'
But no one should suppose that the distinction is entailed by
the Anti-Interference Principle as formulated in DR 5-107(B).
On its face, DR 5-107(B) addresses only the staff attorney,
forbidding him to "permit" his employer "to direct or regulate
18 9
his professional judgment in rendering... legal services."
The rule does not address lawyer-board members who participate in case-specific intake decisions. Moreover, the rule concerns independence of judgment in rendering services to a client, not in deciding whether services will be rendered to a
would-be client. Nor do the opinions ever explain just why a
board decision to reject a prospective client who wanted the
program to lobby for a certain bill would "interfere," while a
categorical ban on lobbying would not. 90 Does it make sense to
185. Id.; see also id. Formal Op. 324 (1970).
186. Id. Formal Op. 324 (1970).
187. See id. (stating that case-by-case consideration poses "the very real
danger that the more controversial causes-those which often provide opportunities for law reforms aiding the poor-will be subject to board veto solely
because of a fear of criticism from certain influential segments of the community").
188. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 49, at 135-36 n.262.
189. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1980).
190. See generally Finman & Schneyer, supra note 49.
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force a nervous board to ban lobbying outright so that it will be
able to justify turning away the politically unattractive client
who might someday arrive at the office seeking lobbying help?
Finally, Formal Opinion 334 indicates that the AntiInterference Principle even forbids certain categorical intake
rules. For example, a rule forbidding class actions is impermissible; l9 ' a rule prohibiting lobbying is permissible; 192 and a rule
prohibiting the giving of advice on legislative reform is impermissible.' 93 These conclusions seem entirely ad hoc. A lobbying ban is permissible, we are told, because a board can limit
"the categories of legal services [staff] lawyers may undertake
for a client." 194 But isn't a class action a "category of service?"
Likewise, an anti-class action rule is invalid because categori195
cal rules "may not be based on... the nature of the remedy."
But why is a class action a "remedy," while lobbying is not?
Thus, the key early opinions applying the Anti-Interference
Principle in a legal services context waffle on whether they are
based on enforceable rules, have not stimulated enforcement of
the Principle, and offer little concrete guidance that is clearly
rooted in ethics rules rather than ad hoc. 96 There is no reason
to think that the meaning and regulatory implications of the
Principle will be any clearer in the MDP context.
There is one more chapter in the legal services story. In
1996, Congress put new restrictions on federally-funded legal
services programs. 197 These included bans on class actions,
claims that can be expected to generate legal fees, and engage-

191. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 334 (1974).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. This does not mean that the opinions contain no good ideas about office policies and procedures or that I could have written better opinions. The
Legal Services Corporation itself has found the opinions of some use in resolving issues that arise in local programs. Congress required the Corporation
to ensure that legal services were provided to the poor in a manner consistent
with the Model Code. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
§ 1007(a)(10). The Corporation in turn indicated that it would "rel[y] on the
ABA's interpretation... thus avoiding inconsistent interpretations by local
bar associations." Legal Services Corporation Act & Regulations, Opinions No.
76-12, at 1 (Dec. 27, 1976), cited in Finman & Schneyer, supra note 49, at 83
n.67.
197. See Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment: Beyond
the InsuranceDefense Paradigm,16 REV. LITIG. 585, 620 n.157 (1997).
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ments for the purpose of influencing the course of welfare reform. 198 Anticipating these changes, the ABA ethics committee
once again addressed the issues confronting legal services lawyers, but in entirely different terms. Formal Opinion 96-399199
does not even mention Model Rules 1.8(f) 200 and 5.4(c), 20 which
are both formulations of the Anti-Interference Principle! Instead, the committee relies heavily on Model Rule 1.2(c), which
permits lawyers to restrict the scope of an engagement so long
as the client consents and the restrictions are not so limiting as
20 2
to breach the lawyer's duty of competence.
As Nancy Moore observes, this is surprising because Rules
1.8(f) and 5.4(c) seem to be directly on point, and Opinions 324
and 334 analyzed the same issues under DR 5-107(B), the
predecessor of those rules. 20 3 Yet Opinion 96-399 does not appear to be an anomaly; the ABA ethics committee also relied on

198. See id. at 620-21.
199. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
96-399 (1996).
200. See supra note 14.
201. See supra note 15.
202. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-399 (1996). The committee adds, however, that a legal services lawyer
who accepts restricted federal funding should inform all clients of the restrictions and obtain their written consent to abide by them, "even if it does not appear likely that a particularrepresentationwill run afoul of those restrictions."
Id. (emphasis added). The committee reasons that the consent requirement of
Rule 1.2(c) "is not conditioned upon the lawyer's believing that such a limitation will materially or adversely affect the representation; consent is a prerequisite to any limitation upon the scope of the representation." Id. In the BB
scenario, if one applies this interpretation to Lawyer's direction of the Litigation Department not to disclose the restriction on advancing expenses over
$80,000 to clients whose cases are unlikely to reach that threshold, the direction would violate Model Rule 1.2(c) but would not violate the AntiInterference Principle.
Model Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer to "limit the objectives of the represenMODEL RULES OF
tation if the client consents after consultation."
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c) (1983). Comments add that "[tihe terms
upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or
means," id. Rule 1.2 cmt. para. 4 (emphasis added), but that "the client may
not be asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate" the
lawyer's ethical duty of competence, id. Rule 1.2 cmt. para. 5. Since lawyers
are increasingly being permitted to "unbundle" traditional legal services into
component parts and to provide some components but not others in return for
a reduced fee, the qualification may not amount to much. See generally David
A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance
Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
959 (1998).
203. See Moore, supra note 197, at 621.
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Rule 1.2(c) and disregarded Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) in its 1996
opinion permitting insurance defense lawyers to accede to in°4
surer control of the defense if the insured's policy calls for it.2
Professor Moore thinks these recent opinions may represent a
significant trend20 5 because Rule 1.2(c) permits scope limitations when the client consents, while Rule 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) do
not provide for legitimating third-party "interference" through
client consent.20 6 With MDP legalization on the horizon, the
institutions of professional self-regulation seem to be abandoning rather than refining the Anti-Interference Principle as a
regulatory tool, even as they extol independent professional
judgment as a core professional value.
d. Group and PrepaidLegal Services Plans
Finally, consider the regulatory history of organizational
structures known as group or prepaid legal services plans.
These plans are designed to serve clients of "moderate means"
who have common legal needs, normally for relatively routine
services. In a group plan, a nonprofit entity such as a union or
the AARP 20 7 provides members with free or reduced-fee legal
services as a benefit of membership. Services are performed either by staff attorneys or by outside lawyers who agree to participate in return for an annual retainer or for lower fees than
they would charge outside the plan. Prepaid legal services
plans are owned and operated by insurers or other sponsors.
For a monthly charge, they offer subscribers certain covered
services at no fee, and others at reduced fees. Again, the par204. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 96-403 (1996); see also supra note 125.
205. See Moore, supra note 197, at 621 n.160, 622. For further evidence of

such

a trend, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 215 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (permitting lawyers, with client consent, to take directions from third-party payors if those directions are "reasonable in scope or character").
206. Professor Moore recognizes that insurance policies have for many
years provided for the insurer's right to control the defense, and she finds it
acceptable for that control to be legitimated by the consent of the insured. See
Moore, supra note 197, at 589-602. She is much less sanguine, however, about
permitting client consent to legitimate third-party control in other contexts,
such as in legal services programs, where the "consenting" client will often
have no alternative, or in cases where a public interest group provides legal
services to others but wishes to retain control over the publicity surrounding
the cases they finance. See id. at 622-27.
207. See Wayne Moore & Monica Kolasa, AARP's Legal Services Network:
Expanding Legal Services to the Middle Class, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503,

535-36 & n.181, 539-41, 543 (1997) (describing program operations).
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ticipating lawyers are either employed by the plan or contractually committed to working within its terms.
Another distinction is important here. Closed-panel plans
give members or subscribers a very limited choice of lawyers;
open-panel plans might enroll every interested lawyer in the
service area. One arguable benefit of closed-panel plans is the
enhanced productivity that full-time specialists in the recurring
legal problems of a plan's subscribers might provide. Another
is the comfort that legally unsophisticated subscribers may
take in a plan's certification of certain lawyers as competent
and trustworthy by the very act of selecting them. On the
other hand, the risk of interference may be greater in closedpanel plans.
Until the 1960s, group and prepaid plans were banned as
lay intermediaries engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Lawyer participation was unethical. 2 8 Then, Supreme Court
decisions struck down state bans on nonprofit plans as inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of free speech and association.20 9 For some time, the ABA resisted these decisions as
they applied to closed-panel plans. As promulgated in 1970,
the Model Code allowed lawyers to cooperate with nonprofit
closed-panel plans, but only when "controlling constitutional
interpretation... requires the allowance of such legal service
activities."2 10 In 1974, the Model Code was amended to give
broad approval to open-panel plans. 2 11 But closed-panel plans
remained improper unless they complied with highly restrictive
conditions: users must be free to "opt out" (i.e., go to non-panel
lawyers) and, if they do so, must be reimbursed in a reasonable
amount for their legal fees; plans must be nonprofit and "reasonably related" yet "only incidental" to the primary purposes
of the organization (i.e., no free-standing plans); and each plan
208. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 80, at 222-28, 256.
209. See generally United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (protecting plan by which union provided services of
a salaried lawyer to assist members on worker's compensation matters);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964) (upholding a union program that advised injured members of need for
legal counsel and referred them to lawyers selected by the union); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protecting a program in which staff attorneys assisted members and others in race discrimination cases).
210.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(5)

(1969).
211. For the text of the ABA's 1974 amendments, see Rowland L. Young,
House of DelegatesActs on Group Legal Services, Shield Legislation, Court OrganizationStandards,and Uniform Divorce, 60 A.B.A. J. 446, 448 (1974).
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must file its articles of incorporation, bylaws, agreements with
and charges with the court
counsel, and schedule of benefits
21 2
having disciplinaryjurisdiction.
A year later, these rules were again liberalized, in response
not only to critical comments from the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department, 2 13 but also to pressure from rank and file
members who wanted the opportunity to participate in closedpanel plans. 21 4 This marked the first serious breakdown within
the ABA over the propriety of practicing law within a nontraditional organizational structure. 215 Since then, the trend
toward lawyer specialization and workplace diversification has
left the ABA powerless to achieve any real consensus on the
propriety of new organizational structures, such as ancillary
businesses 216 and, now, MDPs.

212. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(D)(5)
(1974). By establishing a state supreme court registry for group and prepaid
legal services plans, this requirement foreshadowed some features of the
Commission's proposed regulatory system for nonlawyer-controlled lVDPs, but
it made no provision for audits or certification. The Model Rules and the ethics rules that prevail in most states today do not require these documents to be
filed with state supreme courts. Some state supreme courts, however, have
retained filing requirements. See, e.g., FLA. SUP. CT. R., ch. 9 (2000); WIS.
SUP. CT. R. Rule 11.06 (1999).
213. See, e.g., Justice Department Continues Its Contentions that the Houston Amendments Raise Serious Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A. J. 1410, 1413
(1974) (reprinting statement of Assistant Attorneys General Thomas E. Kauper and Joe Sims); Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal
Services Plans Get an Airing Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A. J.
791, 792 (1974) (reprinting statement of Assistant Attorney General Bruce B.
Wilson) [hereinafter Other Views].
214. See, e.g., Other Views, supra note 213, at 795 (reprinting statement of
F. William McCalpin, former chair of ABA Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, to Senate Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests).
215. For a brief debate summing up the positions of closed-panel proponents and opponents within the bar in the mid-1970s, see Alan B. Morrison,
Bar Ethics: Barrierto the Consumer, TRIAL, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 14 (decrying
ABA ethics rules as roadblocks to the consumer benefits that closed-panel
plans will bring, notably cost reduction and "quality control"); Howard C.
Sorenson, BarEthics: Guardianof the Profession,TRIAL, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 15
(finding the "lay intermediary" problem "at the heart of the hazards associated
with group legal services," and a significant threat to "the quality of service
and the existence of the vast majority of small firms dependent upon middle
income clientele"). In a period of aggressive antitrust enforcement, Mr. Sorenson's expression of concern for the plight of small law firms was not altogether
wise.

216. For an account of the ABA's fierce debates in the early 1990s over
whether to bless or curse the ancillary business concept, see generally
Schneyer, supra note 32.
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In 1987, four years after the ABA adopted the Model Rules,
the ABA ethics committee issued Formal Opinion 87-355.217
That opinion recognized that nothing in the Model Rules categorically bans participation in a closed-panel, for-profit plan
relying on staff attorneys. Instead, it purported to set forth
"guidelines under the [Model Rules] to... identify criteria for
prepaid legal services plans in which it is ethically permissible ...to participate,"2 1 8 much as Opinions 324 and 334 had attempted to do with respect to legal services programs for the
poor. Calling professional independence its "primary" concern,
Opinion 87-355 began by restating the Anti-Interference Principle:
[Nleither the [terms of the] plan nor the participating lawyer [may]
permit the sponsoring entity to interfere with the lawyer's exercise of
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client or to direct or
regulate the lawyer's professional conduct.... Once the lawyer-client
relationship exists between the plan member and the participating
lawyer.., there should be no interference... by the plan sponsor.2 9

When it came to "guidelines" for determining what constitutes
interference, however, the committee became non-committal.
An interference risk was "inherent in these plans," namely "the
potential for economic control of a lawyer who is sufficiently involved in a plan to become financially dependent upon it."22
Moreover, when the participating lawyer or law firm is "exclusively or predominately dependent upon the plan, the issue...
becomes more serious."221 On the other hand, "[iut is, of course,
a question of fact as to whether the lawyer's financial dependence upon the plan's22sponsor is so extensive that it affects the
'
lawyer's judgment. 2
Far from advancing the enforcement of the AntiInterference Principle in the context of group or prepaid plans,
these statements almost seem calculated to discourage it. The
opinion blurs the structural distinction between staff attorneys
and outside lawyers by acknowledging that even lawyers who
rely "predominately" on a plan are vulnerable to interference.
At the same time, it concedes that allowing oneself to become
"financially dependent" on a plan does not in itself constitute
217.
87-355
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
(1987).
Id.
Id. (citing Model Rule 5.4(a), (b) and (c))
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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permitting interference; the dependent lawyer's problem is
simply "more serious." For regulatory purposes, whether a
lawyer has crossed the line and permitted interference is always "a question of fact"-namely, whether her dependency has
affected or is affecting her judgment. On this analysis, in order
to establish a breach of the duty to maintain independent
judgment, disciplinary counsel would have to prove that a lawyer's reliance on a plan's patronage actually induced her to follow a different course than her independent judgment suggested, or would have suggested if only she could have
exercised it. Needless to say, one searches in vain for cases in
which lawyers have been disciplined for such violations.
Even when it poses a concrete question, Opinion 87-355
shrinks from providing an answer with regulatory bite. "[Ihf
the plan undertakes to set limits on the amount of time a lawyer may spend with each client's case, or to fix the number of
cases which must be handled by a lawyer," the committee
writes, "the plan may interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment."2 23 Then again, it may not. Why, one
wonders, was the committee unable to answer such a simple
question definitively? Perhaps it wanted to avoid the ad hoc
nature of its requirements for preserving independence in legal
services offices. Perhaps it recognized that enforcement was
beside the point because state ethics enforcers were not prepared to regulate group and prepaid plans proactively, in the
manner proposed by the MDP Commission's Model Rule 5.8(c).
Or, perhaps it did not want the Justice Department to regard
the ABA as erecting unnecessary barriers to the participation
of lawyers in innovative programs for delivering legal services.
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW MDP INTERFERENCE RISKS
WILL BE GOVERNED
The Commission's proposed system for regulating nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, and particularly for enforcing the AntiInterference Principle, will not come into being in the foreseeable future. Even if the supreme courts adopt Rule 5.8(c) as
part of an MDP legalization package, they will be in no position
to administer the rule in the proactive manner the Commission
appears to contemplate. The rule may yield routine MDP filings with the courts, but expert audits and mandated safeguards seem well beyond the capacity of professional self223. Id. (emphasis added).
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regulation as we know it. Nothing comparable has developed to
manage interference risks in other practice settings where lawyers are accountable to lay superiors.
Quite apart from the limited resources and expertise available to state ethics enforcers, ex ante regulation of practice settings in order to prevent "interference" faces a special difficulty.
One can endlessly extol the importance of lawyer independence
without getting down to brass tacks about what it needs protection from and, thus, what the Anti-Interference Principle requires when lawyers work under nonlawyers. Professional selfregulation has not gotten down to brass tacks. Had the bar and
the state supreme courts tolerated a wider array of workplaces
for lawyers over the past century, perhaps we would be farther
along the learning curve although that is far from clear in view
of the intractable nature of the issues. As things stand, ethics
rules, ethics opinions, and disciplinary cases offer little insight.
This means that whatever procedures MDPs develop to
safeguard lawyer independence will evolve privately through
interactions between MDP lawyers and lay managers; they will
not be the unilateral product of the bar and the courts. That
has largely been our experience with house counsel, legal services lawyers, and lawyers who participate in group or prepaid
plans. If law does influence the procedures MDPs develop, it
will do so primarily through ex post liability, not ex ante regulation. When MDP clients or third parties can show they have
been harmed as a result of undue interference, they will have
claims for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duties against
MDP lawyers and their firms. Fear of claims will motivate
MDPs to manage interference risks sensibly.
If the bar and the courts insist on a certification system in
order to ensure clients that their lawyers are sufficiently independent, they would do well to choose the more modest scheme
proposed a decade ago by Professor Harold Levinson, who is
both a lawyer and an accountant.2 24 Professor Levinson is
deeply concerned about the preservation of lawyer independence, but unconvinced that every work setting for lawyers must
have every attribute of professional independence par excellence-including no lay partners, a diverse client base, nonparticipation in clients' businesses, non-ownership of ancillary

224. See generally L. Harold Levinson, Independent Law Firms That Practice Law Only: Society's Need, the Legal Profession'sResponsibility, 51 OHIO
ST. L. REv. 229 (1990).
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businesses, etc. Instead, he would have the bar establish and
publicize standards of law-firm independence and leave the "instrucformed market" to determine the fate of organizational
225
tures that do and do not meet those standards.
As MDPs become lawful, the bar's chief concern should be
to observe the new workplaces in order to learn what the AntiInterference Principle should entail, not to tell MDPs what we
lawyers already know it entails. For if the truth be told, we
know very little. Like other professionals, lawyers value the
ability to exercise professional judgment as a source of job satisfaction, perhaps even social status. But the policy reason for
discouraging interference through regulation is not to maximize job satisfaction, social status, or tradition. It is to free
lawyers of compromising influences so that they can and will do
their best for their clients, consistent with their duties to protect third-party rights. On this rationale, nonlawyer influence
should count as interference only when it demonstrably worsens or tends to worsen outcomes from a client's standpoint or
forces lawyers to infringe on third-party rights in carrying out
their engagements.

225. Id. at 255.
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